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LOSING CONTROL: REGULATING SITUATIONAL
CRIME PREVENTION IN MASS PRIVATE
PROPERTY*
ROBERT E. PFEFFER**
Introduction
Three young men enter a shopping mall.  In a security office in the mall a
guard monitors them via closed circuit TV.  Based on their appearance, such
as their ethnicity or the way they are dressed, he decides to approach them and
asks for ID.  They are told that if they do not produce ID, they will not be
admitted.  He then runs their names through the computer and finds that one
of them was arrested two years before on a shoplifting charge.  He tells all
three they must leave.
This not uncommon scenario raises nettlesome issues regarding the general
right of the mall owner to exclude persons from the mall property versus the
right of the young men to visit the mall, as well as whether the exclusion was
based on factors — such as race, age, or ethnicity — that many would find at
minimum troubling and perhaps entirely unacceptable.1  The owner of the
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2. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of
PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 24 (1997) (“The power of government to regulate
and to take is closely tied to the correlative rights and duties of ordinary individuals as regulated
and determined in common law adjudication.  This position does not require us to pretend that
each and every common law decision is part of some seamless intellectual web.  Obviously,
some strong differences of opinion persist regarding the application of general common law
principles to particular cases or even entire classes of problems.”); Singer, supra note 1, at 1291
(“Both public perception and fundamental legal principles today suggest that businesses open
to the public have a duty to serve the public without unjust discrimination.  Yet the formal law
does not unequivocally reflect this principle.  I will argue here that the formal law should reflect
the settled social consensus behind this principle, and that, in order to do so, the common-law
rule that grants most businesses the right to exclude customers at will must be changed.”); Sarah
G. Vincent, The Cultural Context of the Shopping Mall: Tension Between Patron’s Right of
Access & Owner’s Right to Exclude, 37 UWLA L. REV. 221, 222 (2004) (“Which is more
important: a protester’s First Amendment rights or a private property owner’s right to exclude?
There are a series of shopping mall cases in which the courts decide whether or not protestors
can use shopping malls to disseminate information to the public against private property
owners’ wishes.  I want to use the shopping mall as an example of how new forms of private
property were addressed by the courts and whether or not that resolution was satisfactory.  I
believe we can learn from the shopping mall cases so we do not repeat the same mistakes in
future controversies involving new forms of property. . . . Then there is a disagreement between
the people who use the space and those who created it.  A question arises: who resolves this
disagreement?  May an owner make up the rules after the game has started or are the rules
implicit in the way that the owner invites people to play the game and how the people have
begun to play it?”); Andrew von Hirsch & Clifford Shearing, Exclusion from Public Space, in
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77, 86 (Andrew von
Hirsch et al. eds., 2000) (“[I]t suffices that we treat as public in character those spaces that
clearly are designed for general public use, such as a large downtown shopping mall replacing
a traditional shopping area.”).
3. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (“Logan Valley Mall is the functional equivalent of a ‘business block’
and . . . must be treated in substantially the same manner.”), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976); Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8,
10 (Ga. 1990) (“The property at issue here is a privately owned and operated shopping mall that
shopping mall likely would claim that he need not explain his or her reasons
for excluding these men because the mall is private property and the mall
owner therefore retains discretion to exclude anyone for any reason or no
reason at all.  The young men might counter that the shopping mall is
effectively a public space because it is the only place in the vicinity that offers
any shopping, entertainment, services, and dining and has replaced the local
downtown as the primary place to walk around and interact with others in the
vicinity.  They might also assert that the mall owner’s criteria for exclusion
included illegitimate factors such as the young men’s age, race, or ethnicity.
This type of scenario has resulted in a lively scholarly debate,2 as well as a fair
amount of litigation.3
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is generally open to the public for shopping, dining and entertainment.  Since the mall’s
opening, its owners have enforced a policy prohibiting all solicitation and political activity in
the mall.  The policy has been applied uniformly to all persons and organizations without regard
to the content or format.  We hold that nothing in the Georgia Constitution or the Recall Act of
1989, either separately or together, establishes a right of private citizens to enter onto such
property to solicit signatures for a recall petition.”); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v.
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (effectively treating mass private space as
public for free speech purposes); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (N.J. 1980) (same).
4. For a more formal definition of these terms, see infra Part I.
5. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.
6. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“It is, of course, well
established that a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on
private property . . . .”); Singer, supra note 1, at 1291.
7. Compare Epstein, supra note 2, at 22 (arguing that “it is difficult to conceive of any
property as private if the right to exclude is rejected”), with Singer, supra note 1, at 1291
(asserting that “the common-law rule that grants most businesses the right to exclude customers
at will must be changed”).  See generally Pruneyard, 447 U.S at 81.
The technique used to exclude these men is often referred to as situational
crime prevention (SCP), and shopping malls fall into a class of property called
mass private property.4  The extent and manner of states’ regulation of owners
of mass private property, such as shopping malls and amusement parks, in
their employment of SCP techniques, such as exclusion of certain groups or
surveillance with video cameras, challenges traditional notions of property law
and the states’ exercise of police power.  The de jure private status of the
property supports the argument that the owner should be free to employ
whatever methods of SCP — short of criminal acts such as assault and false
imprisonment — that the owner deems to be in his or her self-interest;5 the de
facto public nature of the property, however, counsels in favor of allowing a
state to regulate the actions that the owner takes on the property vis-à-vis
members, such as excluding those who fit a certain profile, pursuant to the
state’s inherent police power.6   Although courts and commentators have
grappled with the issue of the extent to which the owners of shopping malls
and the like should be able to employ exclusion, surveillance, or other tactics
to reduce crime or other undesirable activities as a matter of their own
prerogative, free from legislative or judicial interference, there has been little
consensus.7
The current Article puts forth two main critiques with regard to the current
approach and through such critique provides an alternative approach.  First, it
posits that current scholarship and doctrine errs by treating mass private
property either as if it were the same as other private property or as if it were
public space, thus ignoring the dual nature of mass private property as being
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
762 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:759
8. See infra Part III.  See generally, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2; Singer, supra note 1; Von
Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2.
9. James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85, 113 (2002) (“Both
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas understand property ownership as a kind of trust: civil law
permits private ownership on the condition that it serve the common good of the community.
Each property owner is a kind of trustee who has a duty of justice to ensure that his property
meets the needs of his fellow citizens.  According to the principle of subsidiarity implicit in
their thought, it would be unjust for the government to claim sole responsibility for distributive
justice, for this would deny individuals and communities the right to exercise their best
judgment and creative initiative in deciding how their wealth could best serve the common
good.”).
both public and private.8  Second, this Article argues that most cases and
articles that have addressed the issue of SCP by owners of mass private
property analyze the issue as if a given property existed in a vaccuum —
divorced from the city, neighborhood, or area in which it is located — and
ignore the role that such properties play in a given community or locale,
hereinafter referred to as the “community contingent nature of mass private
property.”  In so doing, these cases and articles fail to recognize that the
manner in and extent to which states regulate SCP should depend not only
upon the nature of the property itself but also upon the characteristics of the
setting wherein the property is located, which necessarily has a symbiotic
relationship with the property.9  In response to the failure of current
scholarship and case law with regard to the above issues, the instant Article
seeks to establish a framework for regulating SCP in mass private property that
incorporates both the dual nature of mass private property and community
contingency.
Part I defines mass private property and SCP with more detail and examples
than the rather general description put forth here in the introduction.  Part II
summarizes some prominent literature and case law that seeks to address the
conundrum posed by SCP in mass private property.  Part III discusses the dual
nature of mass property as both private property and public milieu, posits that
the private and public features of mass private property are separate aspects,
and suggests that, however challenging, the best approach to regulating SCP
on such property lies in recognizing and taking account of each of these
characteristics.
Part IV discusses the contingent nature of mass private property, asserting
that such spaces play different roles in different communities.  Because the
meaning of community is a contested concept, the section opens with a
discussion of some arguments put forth about the meaning of “community.”
This Article does not attempt to resolve the problem of defining community
for all purposes, but, less ambitiously, seeks to provide a provisional definition
of community that is sufficient for evaluating the role of a particular mass
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/2
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10. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 306 (1990) (“The law-abiding
public, through its legislatures, has structured the criminal law system to reflect its values and
beliefs.”); Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity
Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 231 (2001) (“In modern societies . . . with moral values
that celebrate individual freedom and rationality, acts that violate the moral order do not
produce as strong a demand for punishment and punishments reflect those values by
emphasizing the humanity of even the offender.”).
11. See Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern
Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1999) (“Countless Americans practically live their lives
in the modern mall. . . . In the late 1960s and the 1970s, the shopping mall had already
developed into a significant American institution, but in the intervening decades, malls like the
Mall of America in Minnesota, the Sawgrass Mills mall in Florida and many others have
literally and figuratively redefined the American landscape.” (footnote omitted)).
private property in a given community.  Part IV then discusses the relationship
between community and regulation of mass private property as two-fold.
First, the type of SCP that is acceptable is partly a function of the role that a
given mass private property plays in a community.  Second, the degree of
freedom that an owner of such property has to regulate conduct in his or her
space raises questions regarding the values of the community in which it is
situated.  Just as punishment expresses the values of the society that
undertakes the punishment,10 the forms of SCP that a community allows or
prohibits in mass private property are also expressive of community values
because such property plays a public role in the community.11  For this reason,
this Article asserts that the community wherein the mass private property is
located should, within certain boundaries, be given broad leeway to regulate
SCP in such space.
Part V sets forth a framework for regulating SCP in mass private property.
This framework is rooted in both the dual public/private nature of mass private
property discussed in Part III, as well as in the arguments put forth in Part IV
that the role that a private property plays in a given community is
geographically and demographically variable and that regulating SCP in mass
private property is an important means by which a community can express
itself.  In sum, Part V argues that the dual public/private nature of mass private
property imposes substantive boundaries upon the community: on one hand,
it delineates a zone of protection for mass private property owners by
providing some limit on the community’s power to restrict the SCP measures
the owner may employ, and on the other hand, it provides a limit as to the SCP
measures that a mass private property owner may implement, even if
authorized to do so by the community.  Within these boundaries, the
community should, with some exceptions discussed in Part V, be the arbiter
of which SCP measures the owner may employ.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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12. Alison Wakefield, Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property, in ETHICAL
AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 125, 125 n.1
(citation omitted) (citing Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Modern Private Security:
Its Growth and Implication, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 193
(Norval Morris & Michael H. Tonry eds., 1981)); see also Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note
2, at 86.
13. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573,
591 (“The term ‘mass private property,’ coined by Shearing and Stenning, refers to large,
privately owned spaces like shopping malls, gated communities, and commercial and industrial
‘campuses’ that depend upon public use.” (footnotes omitted)). 
14. See, e.g., Ethan E. Litwin, Note, The Investigative Reporter’s Freedom and
Responsibility: Reconciling Freedom of the Press with Privacy Rights, 86 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1102
(1998).
15. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 13, at 591 n.122.  Note that some commentators use the term
“mass public space” to denote such properties.  See, e.g., Andrew Von Hirsch, The Ethics of
Public Television Surveillance, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME
PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 59, 74. 
16. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”); see also
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that California’s requirement
that a shopping mall allow expressive activity in the mall was not a taking within the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment given the nature of the activity in relation to the
primary purpose to which the owner of the mall had put the property).
17. Wakefield, supra note 12, at 125; see also Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard Revisited:
Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 656 (1991) (“Where it is important
legally to distinguish between private and public space, as must be done in the search for a
public forum, one should look beyond the property’s title, focusing instead on its physical
layout, its ongoing activity, and the occupants’ reasonable expectations.  Political discourse
naturally complements the medley of ongoing activity within the marketplace.  As the American
I. Mass Private Property and Situational Crime Prevention Defined
A. Mass Private Property
Mass private property is “[a] term coined by Shearing and Stenning . . . to
describe large, privately-controlled tracts of property.”12  Although originally
discussed primarily in non-U.S. sources, the American scholarly literature now
frequently uses the term.13  It is sometimes called “mass private space,” “semi-
public space,”14 or “quasi-public space.”15  To understand what constitutes
mass private property, one must realize that the term refers not only to the size
of the property, but also to its use: it performs the function of public space.16
The paradigmatic mass private property is the large shopping mall that
contains retail stores, restaurants, theaters, and other entertainment centers, as
well as common areas that people often frequent or walk around much like
they would in an urban shopping district.17  There is no precise line, however,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/2
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city evolved, the market expanded into the streets and sidewalks of the central business district.
More recently, as suburban America developed, the privately owned mall has transformed the
marketplace once again.  Each stage of evolution, from a discrete public marketplace to the
expanded central business district to the privately owned mall, has embodied attributes that well
suit the forum role.  Thus, it seems natural to define the modern public forum not in terms of
ownership but rather as a gathering place . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  
18. See Berger, supra note 17, at 656. 
19. See Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86; see also N.J. Coal. Against War in the
Middle E. v. J.M.B Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 781 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 581 n.5 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) (“We realize there may be
differences of degree and that some cases might approach a closeness that would otherwise give
us pause.  Similar concerns apparently infused the debate among Justices of the United States
Supreme Court on these issues.  Addressing precisely the same concerns expressed by
defendants, Justice Marshall said: ‘Every member of the Court was acutely aware [in Logan]
that we were dealing with degrees, not absolutes.  But we found that degrees of difference can
be of constitutional dimension.’  Despite the degrees, the entity to which we apply the free
speech right, the regional shopping center, is clearly and easily discernible and distinguishable
from all others in its constitutional satisfaction of the standard of Schmid; it is distinguishable
in its physical size, its multitude of uses, its layout, and its combination of characteristics that
together compel the imposition of the constitutional obligation.” (citation omitted)).
20. Wakefield, supra note 12, at 125; see also Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86
(“At one end of the spectrum lie facilities that are primarily designed for specified uses: say, a
small atrium in front of a few shops, meant for the convenience of customers but not for general
use.  At the other end, is the large shopping mall which contains numerous retail outlets,
restaurants, recreational facilities, and parking spaces — and which is meant for general public
use.”); Brian Libby, Shopping Around for Second Lives, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, § 2, at 32
(“[M]alls gather a variety of goods into a central cluster, . . . [and] to have an ongoing life, malls
need to take on more uses: social services, housing, religious institutions.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
21. See M. Neil Browne, Virginia Morrison & Kara Jo Jennings, The Role of Ethics in
Regulatory Discourse: Can Market Failure Justify the Regulation of Casino Gambling?, 78
demarcating the boundary between mass private space and other forms of
private property, the distinction being a matter of degree as well as a dynamic
concept that continues to evolve.18  Perhaps the best way to determine what
qualifies as mass private property is the degree to which the property
resembles and functions as public space.19  While the large shopping mall is
the paradigm, mass private property might include such spaces as “an arts
centre . . . with visual and performing arts and licensed refreshment facilities”
or a large shopping center that consists mainly of retail shops but that does not
contain all the entities that one might find in a shopping mall, such as cinemas,
restaurants, or other entertainment facilities.20
The key distinguishing feature is that the private property is open to the
public for multiple uses and even for no particular use.  Many users of mass
private property will go there simply to walk around or to socialize and not
necessarily to purchase anything.21  Moreover, the owners of such properties
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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NEB. L. REV. 37, 62 (1999) (“Also alarming is that young adults are spending more time in
malls than any prior generation.  Dr. James Roberts, assistant professor of marketing at Baylor
University, comments that shopping centers are becoming hangout places where adolescents
seek entertainment and socialization amongst friends.”); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive
Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 131 (2005) (“In
addition to the manifest function of a shopping mall — namely shopping — the mall serves
myriad latent functions, ranging from adolescent socializing to senior citizen physical exercise.
As any urban teenager can testify, the mall is a prime site for dating, hanging out, and meeting
new friends.”); Vincent, supra note 2, at 221 (“The shopping mall is the cathedral of
contemporary culture.  It is the focus of what little social life many of us share with others.”).
22. Elizabeth Joh, Criminal Law: The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 63-64 (2004) (“[T]he mass private property concept identifies a change in
the structure of modern life — where and how Americans live, work, and spend leisure time —
that has led to a more prominent role for private police.”); Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note
2, at 86.
23. Additionally, there are some places that charge admission that might be considered
mass private space, such as amusement parks.  The analysis in this Article will focus on mass
private property that one may enter free of charge.  Nonetheless, to the extent that a property
that charges an entry fee has aspects of mass private property, the same analysis applies.
24. See Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86.  Richard Epstein picks up on this
problem, suggesting that the point at which private property becomes subject to public
considerations is marked not by any quality inherent in the property itself, but rather in the way
a particular court is going to evaluate it.  Epstein, supra note 2, at 34-35.  Furthermore, Michael
Heller notes that “[p]rivate property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely, as its
boundaries fray at the edges.”  Michael A. Heller, Critical Approaches to Property Institutions:
Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 418 (2000) (citing Frank I. Michelman,
Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5 (Am.
Soc’y for Political & Legal Philosophy, Nomos Series No. XXIV, J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1982)).
generally allow people to access these spaces without requiring them to
purchase anything.
Mass private spaces thus are distinguishable from other private spaces, such
as shops, restaurants and cinemas that are open to the public for a particular
use.22  The public can enter such places but only for a particular use and a
limited time.  On the other hand, some shops allow people to browse for
various periods of time, and department stores are probably on the border of
what might be considered mass private space, as they often have many
departments and are set up to encourage people to wander from department to
department.23
For the purposes of the framework put forth here it is not necessary to
delineate the exact line that demarcates mass private property and other private
property.  Locating the exact point at which private space has sufficient public
use to qualify as mass private property would be difficult if not impossible.24
This analysis requires only a sense of the type of properties that qualify as
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/2
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25. Ronald Clarke, Situation Prevention, Criminology and Social Values, in ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 97, 99.
26. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 662 (2006) (“Situational Crime Prevention (‘SCP’) arose out of a
growing realization in the 1970s and 1980s that changes in policing and punishment were
failing to reduce crime levels.”); Richard H. Schneider, American Anti-Terrorism Planning and
Design Strategies: Applications for Florida Growth Management, Comprehensive Planning and
Urban Design, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 138 (2003) (“Articulated by Ronald V.
Clarke from ideas developed while he was at the British home office in the 1960s and early
1970s, situational crime prevention suggests that effective crime prevention depends upon
opportunity reduction.  This can be accomplished by increasing the perpetrator's risk of being
seen or apprehended, by increasing the effort required to commit a criminal act, or by
decreasing the rewards of the act.  According to the theory, any one of these factors may be
sufficient in and of themselves to deter or prevent criminal (or, by extension, terrorist) acts.”
(footnote omitted)).
27. See Ken Pease, Crime Reduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 947,
950 (Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner eds., 2002).
28. See id. at 948-49.
mass private space.  For purposes of the framework this Article proposes, one
can assume that the property in question is at the end of the spectrum closest
to public property — such as a mall with shops, restaurants, services,
entertainment facilities, and other attributes that one would find in a typical
public commercial district — because such property raises the most difficult
issues regarding SCP.  By providing an analysis with reference primarily to
such property, although with some degree of acknowledgement of “less
massive” and “less public” mass private space, this Article develops a
framework applicable to various types of mass private space.
B. Situational Crime Prevention
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is a term most associated with the
British criminologist Ronald Clarke, who notes that while SCP “has come to
mean different things[,] . . . . [i]n its broad[est] meaning, it encompasses any
attempt to manipulate the environment to reduce opportunities for crime.”25
Like mass private property, the concept and terminology has made its way into
American scholarship.26  Less abstractly, SCP, sometimes referred to as
primary crime prevention or reduction, describes steps taken to prevent or
reduce crime before it occurs by reducing opportunities to commit crime.27
SCP stands in contrast to traditional crime control, which seeks to reduce
crime through the deterrent and incapacitating effects of punishment or by
addressing the social and economic causes of crime.28
SCP includes measures such as designing cars with steering locks and
closing off roads in high crime areas to make it harder for potential offenders
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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29. See R. A. Duff & S. E. Marshall, Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical
Dimensions of Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 17; see also Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-
Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1454 (1999) (“For
example, studies have found that the presence of two cashiers greatly reduced the incidence of
convenience store robberies.  In some cases, even simple measures such as increased exterior
lighting have been effective in reducing crime and the fear of crime in particular areas.”);
Cheng, supra note 26, at 662 (citing steel mailboxes as an example of SCP in that the design
of the box itself encourages a default pattern of behavior in which people do not steal mail).
30. See Pease, supra note 27, at 953-56; Martha J. Smith and Ronald V. Clarke, Crime and
Public Transport, 27 CRIME & JUST. 169, 171 (2000) (“Increased supervision would deter many
offenders anxious to avoid detection and arrest.  This can be accomplished through the use of
more conductors and station staff, and by the provision of closed-circuit television (CCTV)
surveillance.”).
31. See Duff & Marshall, supra note 29, at 27, 31; cf. Allison West, Tougher Prosecution
When the Rapist Is Not a Stranger: Suggested Reform to the California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 169, 179 (1994) (discussing the steps that some women take in order to avoid
being raped).
32. See Wendy Holloway & Tony Jefferson, The Role of Anxiety in Fear of Crime, in
CRIME, RISK AND INSECURITY 31, 31-35 (Tim Hope & Richard Sparks eds., 2000); Lucia
Zedner, Too Much Security?, 31 INT’L J. SOC. L. 155, 158 (2003).  Compare David Weisburd
& John Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 56 (2004) (“Evidence of the effectiveness of situational and
opportunity-blocking strategies, while not necessarily police based, provides indirect support
for the effectiveness of problem solving in reducing crime and disorder.”), with Smith and
Clarke, supra note 30, at 204-05 (noting that several studies have shown that actually making
a place safer does not always cause people to feel safer and, conversely, that people can be
made to feel safer even if in reality they are not safer).
33. See Zedner, supra note 32, at 163-66.
to get into and out of such areas.29  It also includes providing better street
lighting at night, outfitting merchandise with tags that trigger an alarm if one
tries to remove the item from a shop without paying, and the installation of
CCTV cameras in shops or in public places.30  Some SCP comes in the form
of advice to individuals to take certain steps to reduce their risks of being
crime victims, such as not walking alone at night or avoiding certain
neighborhoods.31
To foreshadow an issue that will be addressed in subsequent sections, SCP
involves both an objective element (reducing crime) and a subjective one
(making people feel safer), which may not be directly correlated with each
other.32  In fact, some SCP measures that seek to reduce crime may increase
people’s anxiety about crime by raising their awareness of risk.33
As regards mass private property, the two primary SCP techniques the
instant Article addresses are (1) exclusion from such spaces and (2) imposition
of behavioral standards.  In a sense these techniques are just different flavors
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34. See Gregory Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 121
(2004) (“During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous property owners of this
sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics of government policies from
channels of expression opened by their own invitations for the public to use their property.  The
most emblematic incidents involved the expulsion of lone, peaceful protesters from spaces
frequented by the public.  Stephen Downs’s arrest at the Crossgates Mall followed an incident
a few months earlier in which the same mall had called the police to expel several local peace
activists who had taped antiwar messages to their clothing and entered the mall.”); Von Hirsch
& Shearing, supra note 2, at 92; Wakefield, supra note 12, at 132-33.
35. See Wakefield, supra note 12, at 132; see also IRA G. ZEPP, JR., THE NEW RELIGIOUS
IMAGE OF URBAN AMERICA: THE SHOPPING MALL AS CEREMONIAL CENTER 171 (1986) (“When
the number of teens reaches critical mass and their behavior, especially excessive noise and the
blocking of store entrances, has reached unacceptable levels, security is called.  At the extreme,
security personnel or police will ban the young perpetrators from the mall.  For many teenagers,
to be shunned by the mall and thereby isolated from their peers is a fate worse than death.  This
has proved to be an effective deterrent.”); Benfer, supra note 1 (“In late April, the rap star Nelly
entered the Union Station Mall in his hometown of St. Louis to purchase 20 Cardinals jerseys
for a video he was shooting at Busch stadium.  Nelly (given name, Cornelius Haynes Jr.) is a
local celebrity whose presence is usually welcomed.  But on this day he was asked to leave by
the Union Station security staff.  The reason?  He was wearing a do-rag, which is explicitly
prohibited under the Union Station dress code as an item of ‘commonly known gang-related
paraphernalia’ — a category the mall defines as ‘including, but not limited to: wearing or
showing a bandana or do rag of any color, a hat tilted or turned to the side, a single sleeve or
pant leg pulled/rolled up and flashing gang signs.’ . . . But in this mall, as in many others across
America, one doesn't have to be a gang member to be evicted under anti-gang ordinances; one
merely has to dress in a way that makes one look like a gang member, as defined by the mall
in question.”); Skirt Stake, MIAMI NEW TIMES, August 4, 2005, http://www.miaminewtimes.
com/Issues/2005-08-04/news/bitch_full.html (“Although tight, revealing garb and Burberry
tams are venerated as South Florida cultural standards, Lior Gonda, a Web designer from
Weston, was asked to leave a popular mall because he was wearing a demure floor-dusting
skirt.”).
36. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88.
37. Id. at 92; see also Wakefield, supra note 12, at 134.
of the same strategy.  Exclusion is often based on behavior in which one has
previously engaged at the property in question.34  And property owners usually
enforce behavioral standards by removing, and thereby excluding at least
temporarily, those individuals who refuse to abide by the behavioral
standards.35
SCP in mass private property may involve several types of exclusion and
behavioral standards.  Exclusion from a space may be “for a lengthy period.”36
The exclusion also may be brief, such as asking someone who has behaved in
a way unacceptable to the owner to leave the premises and not return for the
rest of the day or until he ceases “engaging in the behaviour.”37
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38. See Wakefield, supra note 12, at 134.
39. ZEPP, supra note 35, at 171; Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City:
Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the Promise of PruneYard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533,
534 (2004) (“Because [mass private] spaces are privately-owned and controlled, owners
regulate behavior within by exerting the most fundamental property right — the right to
exclude.”); Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87; Wakefield, supra note 12, at 132.
40. See Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 90-91; Wakefield, supra note 12, at 131-
32.
41. See Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 131-32; see also Harris, supra note 1, at
8-10 (“Consumer Racial Profiling (CRP) is defined as any type of differential treatment of
consumers in the marketplace based on race or ethnicity that constitutes a denial or degradation
in the product or service offered to the consumer.  In a retail environment, CRP can take many
forms, ranging from overt or outright confrontation to very subtle differences in treatment, often
manifested in forms of harassment.  Outright confrontation includes verbal attacks, such as
shouting racial epithets, and physical attacks, such as removing customers from the store.
Customer harassment includes slow or rude service, required pre-payment, surveillance,
searches of belongings, and neglect, such as refusing to serve African-American customers. . . .
On the other hand, some statistical theories suggest that overt disparate treatment simply arises
from a retailer’s desire to maximize profits and minimize costs, and does not reflect animus
towards a particular group.  A retailer who engages in ‘[r]evenue-based statistical
discrimination’ makes a presumption about the potential revenue he or she may receive from
different types of customers and acts accordingly. . . . Unwittingly, some retailers make
assumptions about their black customers based on stereotypes relating to the propensity of
African Americans to commit crimes and their inability to pay for goods.” (footnotes omitted));
Wakefield, supra note 12, at 130-31.
42. Wakefield, supra note 12, at 130-31.
43. See id. at 130.  The right of an owner of mass private property to exclude someone
without having a valid basis for such varies from the United States to the United Kingdom.
And, in the United States, the standards are different from state to state.  In the United
Kingdom, the owner of a property that is generally open to the public can exclude someone
without giving any reason.  See CIN Props. Ltd. v. Rawlins, [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. 130 (C.A.)
(Eng.).  The U.S. Supreme Court has given states the power to decide whether property owners
may exclude persons arbitrarily, holding that one does not have a federal constitutional right to
The basis for exclusion and the extent to which it is employed varies from
one mass private space to another.38  As already mentioned, the owner of the
private space might exclude a person based upon his or her behavior at that
particular moment.39  Additionally, an owner of mass private property might
attempt to ban persons convicted of criminal offenses committed in that
particular space or elsewhere.40  Further, and most controversially, SCP in
mass private space may take the form of excluding persons who fit a particular
profile.41  Security guards thus may exclude people “whose behaviour or body
language [is] perceived as suspicious . . . [or] who seem[] to be out of place in
relation to the area or time of day.”42  Moreover, security guards might exclude
persons who fit a particular demographic or social circumstance, such as
young people or the homeless.43
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enter private property, even if it is generally open to the public, but also holding that a state’s
requiring a property owner who opens her property to the general public not to exclude persons
arbitrarily does not violate the property owner’s rights.  PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980); Jennifer Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s Treatment of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We Have the
Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 509 (2002).  In light of this holding, several state
supreme courts have interpreted their respective constitutions in various ways as regards the
right to exclude from mass private property.  For example, in New Jersey Coalition Against War
in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that regional shopping centers could not exclude persons wanting to hand out
literature on their property concerning policy issues but could impose reasonable restrictions
upon such activity. 
44. Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 59; see also MARCUS NIETO, CAL. STATE LIBRARY,
PUBL’N NO. CRB-97-005, PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: IS IT AN EFFECTIVE CRIME
PREVENTION TOOL? (1997), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/crb97-005.pdf.
45. Private security guards on mass private property, of course, do raise issues with which
this Article is concerned to the extent that the guards are involved in excluding persons and
enforcing behavioral codes.  Other issues that employment of private security raises, such as
lack of training, the fact that private actors are carrying out traditionally public functions, and
the fact that a public good may end up going to the highest bidder, fall outside the scope of this
Article because those issues, while present with regard to private security guards on mass
private property, are not limited in their employment to mass private space.  These same
concerns are raised with regard to private security guards employed in other settings.
46. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 25, at 110 (putting forth a generally favorable view of SCP
Other forms of SCP, such as CCTV surveillance44 or employment of private
security guards, may also take place on mass private property.  Nevertheless,
the use of SCP techniques other than exclusion and the imposition of
behavioral standards in mass private space does not raise issues peculiar to the
context of mass private space.  It instead raises the same types of legal, ethical,
and other issues in mass private space as in other private or public spaces.45
II. Current Conceptions and Theories of Regulating Situational Crime
Prevention in Mass Private Space
This section provides an overview and critique of some of the arguments
raised concerning regulating SCP in mass private space.  Additional critique
of these arguments will inhere in the arguments set forth in Parts III, IV, and
V.
Arguments as to the authority that owners of mass private property should
have with regard to SCP have generally been substantive and fixed.  Such
arguments seek to reach a conclusion as to what techniques are appropriate on
mass private property and do not take account of the variability of
relationships that may exist between mass private property and the people who
live near the property or would wish to frequent it.46  Moreover, the arguments
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and bemoaning its lack of acceptance among most academics, but failing to focus upon places
and populations as important factors in determining the costs and benefits of SCP); Von Hirsch
& Shearing, supra note 2, at 87-95 (setting forth a model delineating what forms of exclusion
from mass private — and public — property are acceptable without taking account of the role
that such space may play in a given locality).
47.   Duff & Marshall, supra note 29, at 17 (“[T]here are morally significant differences
between the groups on which SCP measures impact.”); David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and
Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME
PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 1, 13 (“[SCP] also allows a form of local or even individual action
that can be undertaken directly by those fearful of crime.”); Michael S. Scott, Community
Justice in Policing, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 415, 433, 436-37 (2006) (“One dimension of the broad
community justice approach is that the systems in which offenders are adjudicated ought to take
better account of the desires, needs, perspectives, and interests of the community most directly
affected by the offenders’ conduct.  While crime can be said to have consequences to society
as a whole, it has more immediate and tangible consequences for the smaller communities in
which particular crimes occur. . . . Just as individuals have different capacities and competences
to solve problems, so too do communities.  Not all communities or community groups are
equally staffed, organized, trained, resourced, connected, or skilled to push the buttons and pull
the levers of social control to bring about purposeful, significant, and lasting improvements to
public safety.”).
48. See, e.g., Judy Johnson, The Importance of Obtaining Community Support to Reduce
Crime, in HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION 599, 609 (Lawrence J.
Fennelly ed., 1982) (“If crime prevention is to be effective in improving the quality of life, the
role of the community-at-large must be expanded to include supportive efforts from a broad
base of existing private sector groups . . . within a jurisdiction.”); Wakefield, supra note 12, at
144 (stating that “[f]or privately-controlled territories to operate as sites for public life, there is
a need to strike a balance in the controls that are adopted, so that they may serve their local
communities effectively as truly communal spaces” while failing to expand upon this kernel).
49. See, e.g., Wakefield, supra note 12, at 144.
50. See, e.g., John Kleinig, The Burdens of Situational Crime Prevention: An Ethical
Commentary, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION,
supra note 2, at 37 (noting the “tendencies . . . associated with attempts to legitimise and elevate
SCP, but which . . . lead it to overreach its capabilities.”); Von Hirsch, supra note 15 (discussing
the ethics of CCTV surveillance in mass private space and elsewhere).
do not engage the issue of the mechanism by which decisions should be made
as to what forms of SCP are acceptable in a given mass property.  And
although some scholars have recognized that the quantity and quality of SCP
that one may employ might vary from person to person or place to place,47
existing scholarship does not  address the issue of what role communities in
which mass private properties are located should play as arbiters of what is and
is not appropriate SCP on such properties.48  Some of these scholars have
focused upon SCP (including exclusion) in terms of mass private space,49
while others have focused on barring given members of the public (and other
SCP techniques) more generally, whether or not such occurs in mass private
space or elsewhere.50
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51. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1291.
52. See id.
53. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 160 (2001).
54. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86; see also Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d
1294, 1300 (Or. 1989) (“Shopping malls have become part of American life.  Large numbers
of the public gather there.  Although plaintiff tries to cloak a public mall as a private place, it
is the antithesis of a private place.”); Alexander, supra note 11, at 44 (“[T]he modern mall is
the new downtown. . . . [T]he malls of today have replaced the downtowns of yesterday, and
as such, the malls have taken on a public function which resembles that of the company town
of Marsh, even including streets, restaurants, hotels and churches.” (referencing Marsh v.
A. Commentary Opposed to SCP Because Mass Private Space Functions as
Public Space
Many commentators have formulated their analysis by explicitly or
implicitly treating mass private property as if it were purely public space or
close to being public space and arguing in favor of strong limits on exclusion
and other forms of SCP.  This group of commentators includes Singer,
Garland, Von Hirsch, Shearing, Gray and Gray, and Duff and Marshall.
Singer argues that in contemporary society the common law rule that private
business owners generally have the right to exclude at their discretion should
be changed in favor of a regime that would take as a given that any member
of the public would have the right to enter shopping malls, retail shops,
restaurants, places of entertainment, and similar businesses.51  Thus, Singer
does not limit his argument regarding the use of the SCP technique of
exclusion to mass private space.52
Garland, focusing on SCP primarily in the mass private space setting,
describes exclusion from such spaces and other such techniques in wholly
negative terms:
In these private settings (many of which are mass public spaces
such as shopping malls that happen to be privately owned and
administered) individuals may be required to submit to searches, or
be monitored and filmed, and they may be subject to exclusion
without cause shown.  There is here a rough justice of exclusion
and full-force surveillance that has become more and more routine
in our experience and which is increasingly viewed as a necessary
condition for securing the safety and pleasure of consumers and
decent citizens . . . .53
Von Hirsch and Shearing, also focusing on mass private space, argue that
owners of such properties should not have broad exclusionary powers because
such property “performs the functions of public space.”54  Although they note
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Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946))); Mulligan, supra note 39, at 539 (“Malls have also shouldered
widespread community functions.”).
55. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 79; see also Magarian, supra note 34, at 121,
124 (“Private property is often essential for political debate because so much public interaction
takes place in privately owned space, from shopping malls to the Internet.  No one advocates
wholesale appropriation of private property for the sake of public discourse, but expressive
activity is a natural and appropriate byproduct of the general uses to which certain property
owners — such as shopping mall owners, media corporations that depend on advertising
revenues, and Internet service providers — choose for self-interested reasons to dedicate their
property.  During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous property owners of
this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics of government policies from
channels of expression opened by their own invitations for the public to use their property. . . .
First Amendment law has always reflected a central concern with the chilling of speech — the
danger that threats or reprisals against unpopular speakers will dissuade others from speaking
their minds and challenging the status quo.  The anticommunist purges that followed the two
World Wars are only the most prominent examples of how nongovernmental reprisals and
intimidation can chill political expression.”).
56. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87; see also Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506 (“The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it.  Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not
operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm.  Since these facilities are built and operated
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is
subject to state regulation.” (citation and footnote omitted)).
57. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86; see also Alexander, supra note 11, at 1
(“Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right
to engage in expressive activity in privately owned shopping malls.  While the Court has
recognized the individual states’ right to extend to their citizens greater protections under the
state constitution, only a few have done so in this area.  Many instead have turned a cold
shoulder to those seeking to express themselves.  In this context, the promise of American
democracy is being thwarted.”); Christopher M. Kelly, “The Spectre of a Wired Nation”:
Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis in
Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 559, 627-28 (1997) (“Claims that the Internet is a public
forum neglect one major factor that was a significant dividing line among the Justices in Denver
Area: one of the primary questions in determining whether a potential ‘place’ for speech can
be a public forum is whether it is in fact public.  Privately controlled space cannot generally be
deemed a forum open to expression without some prior regulatory involvement.  There are of
course the hard cases of company towns and shopping malls that make this distinction a bit
that SCP steps such as exclusion may serve to reduce crime, the use of such
measures “in areas having public use entails serious losses of personal
liberty.”55  They therefore conclude that a mass private space, such as “a large
privately-owned mall that invites the public to enter without specification of
purpose is . . . offering a public service, and thus may be called upon to ensure
that all members of the public have proper access.”56  Their analysis therefore
“treat[s] as public in character those spaces that clearly are designed for
general public use.”57
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more blurry.  But that does not mean that there is no public/private property distinction,
especially when it comes to government action that ‘opens up’ a space for speech access.  The
different approaches of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas above indicate how
characterization of the space at issue affects the outcome.  Establishing a World Wide Web site,
for example, requires both the use of a portion of cyberspace that is generally public in
character — the network of networks that comprises the Internet — and one that is generally
private in character — the host computer that the individual posting the page either owns or on
which she has leased space.  When another user aims to access an individual’s web page, she
goes through the public network to reach the private one.  Does this somehow trigger a public
forum analysis?” (footnote omitted)).
58. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88-93.
59. Id.
60. Von Hirsch and Shearing actually do not focus solely on mass private property and, in
fact, speak in terms of public space throughout much of their essay.  See, e.g., id.  Because they
view mass private property as public space for purposes of evaluating SCP, however, their
public space arguments are also arguments about mass private property.
61. Id. at 92; Wakefield, supra note 12, at 134-35.
62. Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88-92.
63. Id. at 92-93.
64. [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. 130 (C.A.) (Eng.).
65. See id. at 134H-134JJ; JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE
NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE 21 (2000) (“Furthermore, private owners who openly invite
‘general’ members of the public to enter and use their property might expose themselves to
certain restrictions on their ability to exclude ‘specific’ members of the public.”); Joan L.
McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection: Is This Land Made for You and
Me?, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 427 (1999) (“For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, the owner of a shopping mall asserted that his right to exclude permitted him to stop
persons from passing out pamphlets at the mall.  The state required mall owners to allow private
individuals to ‘exercise state-protected rights of free expression.’  The mall owners claimed this
requirement constituted a taking under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court rejected the
mall owner’s taking argument.  Having control over who enters one’s house protects vital
Beyond this, Von Hirsch and Shearing then put forth a detailed framework
for regulating SCP in mass private space.58  They distinguish between long-
term or permanent exclusion and short-term exclusion.59  Inherent in their
assertions are arguments about regulation of conduct in mass private
property,60 because short- or long-term exclusion is the general enforcement
mechanism for not complying with the behavioral standards set by the owner.61
Von Hirsch and Shearing see long-term or permanent exclusion from mass
private space, whether based on profiling or conduct, as problematic under
almost any circumstance.62  However, they see brief conduct-related exclusion
as acceptable.63
Similarly, Gray and Gray argue against giving broad powers of exclusion
to owners of mass property, asserting that the English court decision in CIN
Properties Ltd. v. Rawlins,64 which held that owners of mass private property
retain the right of arbitrary exclusion,65 was wrongly decided because the
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interests, such as keeping secure private and personal space.  Mall owners cannot claim those
same vital interests are violated by not being able to exclude persons, who are exercising their
right to free expression, from a public mall.  Merely weighing the interests involved — namely
the interest in excluding speakers from a mall and the interest in speaking in a place where the
public congregates — demonstrates that the more weighty interest is the interest in speech in
a public place.  This shows we cannot, contrary to Blackstone’s beliefs, maintain there is a
single incident of ownership that is essential to all property claims.” (footnotes omitted)).
66. Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space,
1999 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 46, 49-50, 63 (U.K.).
67. Duff & Marshall, supra note 29, at 21; see also Mulligan, supra note 39, at 561 (“A
superior rule would hold that wherever the public is freely and openly invited to gather for no
particular purpose, the space will be considered public, and whoever owns the property will
exert control as a state actor.”).
68. Duff & Marshall, supra note 29, at 21.
69. Id.
70. Garland, supra note 47, at 9.
71. See Clarke, supra note 25, at 110.
72. Id. at 104.
power to exclude from mass private property that is functionally public should
be limited to public interest concerns.66  Likewise, Duff and Marshall
“assum[e] that the mall is or should be a public space, providing public
goods.”67  Thus, they assert that SCP measures that curtail people’s freedom
to enter mass private spaces, either by generally excluding them or ejecting
them based upon behavior, “exclude them from access to goods . . . in which
they should as citizens be able to share.”68  Therefore, SCP that involves
limiting access or activity in mass private space “is intrinsically inappropriate
to the proper end of securing the public good of crime prevention, since it
prevents crime only by transforming, and distorting, that public good into a
private good.”69
B. Commentary in Favor of SCP Based on a Fixed View of Mass Private
Space’s Relationship to Community
The theorists who are more favorable to the use of exclusion or other SCP
techniques in shopping malls and elsewhere also posit arguments rooted in a
fixed view of the relationship between a given property and the population
who frequents the property and lives or works near it.  For example, Ronald
Clarke, “[t]he person most closely associated with the development of SCP,”70
calls for greater use of SCP in mass private space and elsewhere.71  He notes
criticism that some have made that “[t]he use of situational crime prevention
results in the exclusion of so-called ‘undesirables’ (vagrants, the homeless,
minorities and unemployed young people) from public places such as
shopping malls, parks and entertainment facilities.”72  Clarke grudgingly
acknowledges this concern but fails to resolve the issue or seek a solution that
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73. See id.
74. See David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private
Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 43 (2000);
Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.
75. See Callies & Breemer, supra note 74, at 43; Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.
76. See Callies & Breemer, supra note 74, at 43; Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.
77. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 39, at 539-40; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at
80.
78. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 24; Singer, supra note 1, at 1291.
takes account of the variability of the costs and benefits of SCP from one
property to another.73
Callies, Breemer, and Epstein focus their respective analyses in this area on
the issue of the property owner’s right to exclude.74  These scholars are not
focused particularly on the issue of crime control.  Nevertheless, because the
focus of their articles is exclusion (perhaps the most controversial form of
SCP) from mass private space,75 the issue that is the topic of the instant Article
inheres in their analyses.  Each scholar argues that the right to exclude is a
fundamental right of the private property owner, irrespective of the public
characteristics of the property.76  Therefore, they do not feel compelled to
question the extent to which the relationship between a particular property and
its locale should enter the analysis. 
The above noted scholarship assumes that SCP practices are the same in
quality and degree in mass private spaces across all communities.  These
articles ignore the variations among communities in which various properties
are located and the implications those differences have for formulating policy
as to the techniques that the owners of such properties may employ.
Furthermore, the articles fail to fully appreciate the dual nature of mass private
space as both private and public space.  In contrast, the present Article treats
both the relationship between a given property and the community in which
it is located and the dual nature of mass private space as paramount in finding
a workable solution to the challenge presented by the use of SCP in mass
private space. 
III. Reenvisioning Mass Private Space in Its Dual Nature
Commentators have recognized that mass private space does not fit neatly
into previous conceptions of property.77  As noted in the previous section,
however, courts and commentators have generally tried to treat mass private
property as if it were public space or as if it were purely private property.78
Thus, “English law now treats mass private space much like purely private
property [while] American law has important qualifications of that approach,
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79. Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 74; see also Gray & Gray, supra note 66, at 49-50, 63
(arguing that mass private space is functionally public and should be treated as such).
80. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).  See generally Singer,
supra note 1, at 1374-75 (collecting state civil rights statutes that address the right of access and
rules against discriminating based on various factors such as race and ethnicity in places of
public accommodation).
81. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968).
82. Cf. Heller, supra note 24, at 418 (“Private property is a complicated idea to pin down
precisely, as its boundaries fray at the edges.”).
83. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980); Epstein, supra note
2, at 22. 
84. See Mulligan, supra note 39, at 539-41.
relating for example to racial discrimination . . . .”79  While it is true that the
American law has been more attuned than English law to the differences
between mass private property and other private property, the approach of
American legislatures and courts still does not recognize the dual nature of
mass private space.  First, some laws, such as those prohibiting exclusion
based upon race or gender, apply equally to almost all properties open to the
public in some sense;80 there are generally no statutes geared specifically for
mass private space.  Second, while some court decisions have treated mass
private spaces as public spaces,81 in doing so they overlook the private nature
of the property altogether.  In short, the American approach involves a set of
federal and state statutes that cut back on exclusion generally, irrespective of
whether the property is in any sense mass private space, and inconsistent court
decisions treating mass private spaces as either purely public or purely private.
The instant Article posits that mass private property is both private property
and public space in a sense that neither true (de jure) public space nor non-
mass forms of private property open to the public, such as restaurants,
hardware stores, and clothiers not located in a mall, are.  Therefore, in
formulating a model, both the private property interests and the public access
interests need to be taken into account.  Both interests are legitimate and the
contradictions they raise, while presenting a challenge, do not warrant ignoring
one interest in favor of the other.82  Put differently, mass private space remains
private property, a fact that cannot be ignored.83  At the same time, however,
traditional approaches to regulating private property and, for purposes of this
Article, SCP on private property must be reexamined given the de facto public
nature of the property.84
Despite scholarly and doctrinal debate as to whether private space should
be treated as public space for purposes of SCP, this colloquy has not further
devoloped the notion of mass private space having a dual quality.  Von
Hirsch’s approach is illustrative.  He states:
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85.  Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 74 (citation omitted) (citing Kevin Gray, Property in
Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252 (1991)); see also Mulligan, supra note 39, at 560 (“The court
concluded that Robins v. Pruneyard does not require that a ‘shopping center’s obligations vis-à-
vis expressive activities completely mirror those of the government.  Such a conclusion would
fly in the face of the reality that a shopping center wears two hats: one is as a center of
commerce and the other is as a public forum located on private property.’” (quoting Union of
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 852-53 (Ct.
App. 1997))).
86. See Von Hirsh, supra note 15, at 74.
87. See Callies & Breemer, supra note 74, at 43.
88. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-84.
89. For further discussion of the concept of community, see infra Parts IV-V. 
90. See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Public Regulation of Private Crime Prevention,
539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102 (1995).
[T]he public character of [mass private] space and its uses would
appear to warrant regulation comparable to that appropriate for
publicly-owned space with similar functions.  Underlying this view
is the notion of property as constituted by a bundle of rights held by
the property owner: some of these may be restricted while
preserving others.  The owner of mass [private] space thus should
be entitled to operate and seek to make a profit on it much like
other private investment.  But if the facility’s use is comparable to
that of public space, there should be restrictions on practices that
infringe the privacy of its users comparable to those that should be
applicable to public spaces.85
While this description is apt, it argues that mass private space is effectively
public space.86  The model proposed in the instant Article, in contrast, is based
upon the realization that mass private property, despite having a public aspect,
also retains facets of private property.  It ensures that the owner retains some
rights — including the right to employ some forms of SCP, particularly
exclusion and regulation of behavior on her property — and is rooted in the
“bundle of rights” paradigm.87  Similarly, the fact the property is being put to
a particular public use means that the private property rights that the owner
retains from the bundle will be fewer than for other forms of private property.88
The importance of this dual public/private concept of mass private property
to the framework proposed here is as follows.  The framework has both a
procedural and substantive quality.  Procedurally it envisions the community89
as the primary regulators of SCP in mass private space.90  Substantively,
however, it puts boundaries on the legitimate scope of regulation, both in terms
of what limits the community can impose on the property owner’s use of SCP
and what the community may allow the owner to do.  The dual nature of the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
780 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:759
91. Epstein, supra note 2, at 34.
92. See Vincent, supra note 2, at 221-22.  For further discussion of this argument, see infra
Part V.
93. For further discussion of what types of connections to mass private property are
necessary to give a community a legitimate interest in regulation, see infra Part V.
94. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980) (discussing the role of
judicial intervention when the representative process does not function properly).
95. See supra Part II.
96. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); CIN Props. Ltd. v.
Rawlins, [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. 130 (C.A.) (Eng.); Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 85-95;
Wakefield, supra note 12, at 143-44; discussion supra note 43.
property has implications both for these boundaries as well as for the
procedural components of the framework.  
The first boundary is rooted in the concept that the space in question is in
fact private property.  The fact that it is open to the public generally and
therefore has a major impact on civic life does not of itself merit the
conclusion that the property owner has forfeited all property-based rights.91
Conversely, the fact that the space is privately owned does not merit treating
the space as though it were the same as non-mass private spaces and allowing
the property owner to engage in SCP measures merely because he would be
allowed to do so if in fact the space in question were purely private or open to
the public for only limited purposes.92
Another aspect of the proposed framework is that although the community
ought to be able to generally decide (within the above mentioned boundaries)
which SCP measures are acceptable in mass private property to which the
community has a connection,93 there are situations in which the mechanism of
representative community decision making is suspect.94  Recognizing the dual
nature of mass private property plays two roles with regard to the issue of
procedurally suspect community decision making.  First, such recognition may
provide some indication as to when community decision making has run afoul
of accepted norms.  Second, it may provide a basis for imposing a solution
when the community has not acted properly in regulating mass private space.
IV. Situational Crime Prevention, Mass Private Space, and Community
Contingency
As discussed earlier,95 most judicial decisions and commentary concerning
the regulation of SCP on mass private property have been substantive in
nature, delineating which types of exclusion and behavior regulation in such
spaces are acceptable and which are not.96  These writings do not generally call
for the community affected by such measures to play a role in regulating SCP.
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97. Used either on its own or as part of a phrase, the word “community” is an emotive one.
Like “family,” it has often been put forth as an unquestionably good thing, which many people,
especially those who have public exposure, are loathe to challenge.  Nicola Lacey & Lucia
Zedner, Discourse of Community in Criminal Justice, 22 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
[J.L.S.] 301, 302 (1995) (U.K.) (noting that community “carries with it a certain normative
force”); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 400 (1982) (“Thus, in the community, with all that
word’s connotations of a warm, caring group of neighbors and friends, the deviant would
mysteriously be reconstituted.”).  After all, how could any decent person be against
“strengthening the community” or challenge the need for “family values”?  It has an appeal for
both the Left and Right on the political spectrum: after years of pessimism that “nothing works”
with regard to the crime problem, starting in the 1970s there was a new optimism and agreement
across the political spectrum that “something can be done about crime if it is done . . . with the
support of the community.”  Gordon Hughes, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships: The
Future of Community Safety, in CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: NEW
DIRECTIONS 123, 124 (Gordon Hughes, Eugene McLaughlin & John Muncie eds., 2002)
(quoting Daniel Gilling, Community Safety; A Critique, BRIT. CRIMINOLOGY CONFS.: SELECTED
PROC., March 1999, at 1, http://www.britsoccrim.org/volume2/007.pdf); see also Devin J.
Doolan, Jr., Comment, Community Prosecution: A Revolution in Crime Fighting, 51 CATH. U.
L. REV. 547, 553-54 (2002) (“During the 1960’s, a major transformation took place in the
United States criminal justice system.  The method of policing shifted from crime prevention
and community involvement to a reactive system of criminal apprehension and office
centralization. . . . The uniformity of the traditional criminal justice system prevented law
enforcement officials from identifying and addressing citizens’ local concerns.” (footnotes
omitted)).  Doolan suggests that the tide began to turn against this uniform approach to criminal
justice in 1982 with the publication of an article by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George
E. Kelling in the Atlantic Monthly.  Id. at 556.  This article introduced the “broken window”
theory, which “established a connection between low-level crime and serious crime” and,
according to Doolan, inspired the concept of community policing.  Id. at 557.
XXx“Community penalties” and “community policing” conjure up images of progressive and
decent ways of dealing with crime.  The Left finds such rhetoric appealing as it implies an
understanding and less harsh way of dealing with criminals and victims — perhaps bringing
them together to understand each other and reach a mutually agreeable solution.  The Right
takes comfort in calls for a return to “community” and for more emphasis on “community
Part IV.A will provide a definition of community for purposes of this
Article; it does not seek to define this often amorphous term for all contexts
in which it might be used.  Part IV.B. then asserts that SCP in mass private
space is contingent upon the relevant community (as that term is defined in
Part IV.A) in which it is employed.  The assertion here is that SCP in mass
private space cannot be evaluated either in the abstract or in general terms, but
rather must be analyzed by examining it in actual application in specific spaces
and places.
A. What Is Community?
Community is a contentious and contested term.97  As used in the
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values,” as such conjures up images of a time when decent people looked out for one another
and had rigidly defined roles — a time before there was poverty, racial tension, serious crime,
and ambiguously defined gender roles and family units.  If crime, racism, homosexuality, or
drug and alcohol abuse existed, it only existed in other places — it did not “openly” exist in
“decent communities.”  In reality, as much recent critical scholarship has indicated, the
“community” — whose loss so many cite as the source of modern-day problems, from crime
to divorce and ecnomic instability, and whose resurrection will be salvation for both the deviant
and the victim of deviance — probably never really existed in the manner and to the degree that
those who invoke its name claim.  Furthermore, “community” has been used so broadly in
recent rhetoric that it in some sense has no fixed meaning.  GARLAND, supra note 53, at 124;
INDEP. COMM’N ON POLICING FOR N. IR., A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND
40 (1999), available at http://www. belfast.org.uk/report/chapter07.pdf (“[Community policing]
has many definitions and has become somewhat devalued by frequent and indiscriminate use.”)
98. Lacey & Zedner, supra note 97, at 302; see also Scott, supra note 47, at 435
(“Determining what is a community and who speaks for it is more than just a semantic exercise.
To be sure, the term ‘community’ has varied definitions: (1) a group of people living in the
same locality and under the same government, (2) the district or locality in which such a group
of people lives, (3) a group of people having common interests, similarity, or identity, (4)
society as a whole.” (footnote ommitted)).
99. GARLAND, supra note 53, at 123.
100. Id.
101. Id.; Lacey & Zedner, supra note 97, at 301; Robert M. Chiappetta, Book Note, Bringing
the Tools of Justice into the Community, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 433 (2000) (reviewing TODD R.
CLEAR & DAVID R. KARP, THE COMMUNITY JUSTICE IDEAL: PREVENTING CRIME AND
ACHIEVING JUSTICE (1999)) (“The institutions of justice, such as courts, parole offices, and
justice centers, must be geographically located within the neighborhood they serve (preferably
within the same complex).  The process of crime prevention also begins and ends in the
community.”).
sociological sense, the term “[c]ommunity . . . ranges across, and hence
borrows meaning from, spatial, temporal, kinship, ethnic, institutional, and
many other reference points.”98  In the last twenty-five to thirty years
politicians and some academics from a wide spectrum of persuasions have
used “community” as a catchall word, either alone or in connection with other
words.99  Thus, one often hears or reads about “community values,”
“community penalties,” and “community policing.”100  “Community” has been
used in connection with a range of social and political issues, including, for
purposes of this Article, the causes of and solutions to the problem of criminal
behavior.101  In choosing the word “community” as an instrument for
regulating SCP, this Article employs a term that can mean any number of
things (or in a sense have no meaning at all).  Nevertheless, although
“community” is necessarily a problematic term, by sufficiently defining the
manner in which it is used here, the term has a meaning that serves the
purposes of the proposed model.  That is, the instant analysis does not purport
to settle the problem of finding one true meaning of community, but rather
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102. Lacey & Zedner, supra note 97, at 303; David Nelken, Community Involvement in
Crime Control, 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS [C.L.P.] 239, 260 n.2 (1985) (U.K.); James V.
Schall, The Corporation: What Is It?, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 105, 109 (2006) (“There are two
common goods, but in different senses of that word.  In Latin they are called bonum commune
hominis [the common good of man] and bonum commune communitatis [the common good of
the community].  The first of these is identical in meaning with happiness.  It is common in the
sense that it is the same in essence among all human beings . . . . The other, the bonum
commune communtatis [sic], or the good of the social community, is a means, not an end.  It is
common in the sense that all individuals, in their pursuit of happiness, must employ it as a
means to that end.” (quoting MORTIMER J. ADLER, ADLER’S PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 67-68
(1996))).
103. See Lacey & Zedner, supra note 97, at 304 (noting that “[c]ommunity may be construed
as an agency by which social policy is pursued and upon which responsibility should be
thrust . . . [or] as the locus in which policy initiative may be sited”).
104. See generally Scott, supra note 47, at 435-36.
105. See infra Part V.
106. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 11 (1996)
(discussing views held by William Blackstone, Felix Frankfurter, and John Marshall Harlan that
placed a high value on law making at the point of application tailored to the particulars of the
circumstance in contrast to the formulation of broader rules to be applied across the board).
seeks a working meaning of community that is sufficient for purposes of the
argument put forth herein.
The uses of “community” can be broken down into community as an end
and community as a means to other ends.102  The present Article employs the
term as a means for regulating SCP in mass private space.  Moreover, this
analysis uses the term community both as an instrumentality for regulating
SCP in mass private space and as a place in which such regulation takes
place.103  Specifically, the structure that this Article puts forth envisions a
model in which relatively local political entities play a major role in regulating
SCP in mass private space located within the community to which such
political entities are accountable.  The proposed model is therefore flexible.104
In many cases, representatives, rather than all the members who comprise the
relevant community, will take action to regulate SCP in mass private space; in
other jurisdictions, communities may act through referendum.
Another way of understanding the argument in favor of the community as
a regulator of SCP in mass private space is to examine what should not be the
primary manner of regulating SCP in mass private space.  Within some broad
boundaries discussed later,105 the types of SCP that an owner of mass private
property should be allowed to employ should not be decided a priori, with no
reference to the particular property and its role in relation to the place in which
it is located and the people who would seek to use the space.106  Thus, the
model here rejects the arguments in favor of a detailed, substantive framework
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107. Cf. id.
108. See Scott, supra note 47, at 433.
109. ZEPP, supra note 35, at 65-66 (“The phrase ‘meet you at the mall’ has become part of
our language.  Although community is, by definition and experience, not something we create,
the mall has been successful in fostering a sense of community.  Regardless of the negative
judgments made against them, malls are indisputably an alternative to the ennui and isolation
found in urban and suburban America.”); Lacey & Zedner, supra note 97, at 303.
110. GARLAND, supra note 53, at 148; see also MICHAEL S. SCOTT, PROBLEM-ORIENTED
GUIDES FOR POLICE SERIES NO. 6: DISORDERLY YOUTH IN PUBLIC PLACES 3 (2002)
(“Communities are often divided over what constitutes acceptable youth conduct.  This is
especially true in areas undergoing substantial demographic change — for example, an influx
of youth where older residents predominated, or an influx of a new ethnic or racial group.”).
that is meant to apply in all places.107  Moreover, regulation of SCP on mass
private property should generally not be imposed from without by distant
judicial, legislative, or executive agents.108
Thus, as regards SCP in mass private space, community refers to (1) the
people who (themselves or through representation) will effect the regulation
and (2) the manner in which they will do so, although the model leaves much
leeway with regard to the latter issue.  At this point, the specifics of the
community as a population and as a mechanism are still somewhat abstract.
The discussion in Part V.B, infra, will add specificity to the general framework
developed here.
B. SCP in Mass Private Space as Contingent upon the Relevant Community
Keeping in mind the above concept of community as both agency and
location,109 this Part argues that SCP in mass private space is a reflection of
(and therefore contingent upon) the relevant community.  It also argues that for
this and additional reasons set forth herein, communities should be the primary
regulators of SCP in mass private space.  Part V.B, infra, then elaborates on
the logistics of the community as primary regulator of SCP in mass private
space.  Thus, the instant part is the “why” of community regulation of SCP,
while Part V.B is the “how.”
1. The Role of Community in SCP
As Garland notes, “[s]ocial groups and individuals are differentially placed
in respect to crime — differentially vulnerable to victimization, differentially
fearful about its risks, differentially oriented by values, beliefs and education
in their attitudes to its causes and remedies.”110  Garland adds:
[T]he present-day world of private-sector crime prevention exists
in a reflexive relationship to the theories and prescriptions of
situational crime prevention.  It is in this interchange — between
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111. GARLAND, supra note 53, at 161.
112. Id. at 161-65, 201-03.
113. Id. at 123-24; Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability:
Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1573, 1575 (2003) (“Community courts are part of a number of new government models
encouraging ‘community’ participation and aspiring to community empowerment.  These
models attempt to narrow the gap between top-down bureaucratic control and participatory local
democracy.”).
114. GARLAND, supra note 53, at 131-38.
115. Id. at 201-03.
116. Id. at 163.
117. Id. at 158-63.
118. Id. at 163-65.
the practical recipes of the commercial sector managers and the
worked-out rationalities of criminologists and government policy-
makers — that one must locate the strategy or preventative
partnership and the habits of thought and action upon which it
depends.111
Thus, although Garland sees the social groups as being central to crime and
crime control, in discussing SCP in the private sector, it is as if the community
as it had existed has disappeared, both in terms of what does take place and
what he believes should take place.112  This is curious in that Garland himself
argues that the road to SCP in mass private property (as well as other types of
late-modern crime control) lies in changes in communities.113  Yet, when he
discusses the tangible manifestations of the changes in the late twentieth
century and early twenty-first century, it is as if extracommunity entities have
hijacked the institutions in question from the very society that makes such
institutions possible.114  Most importantly for the issue with which the present
Article is concerned, while Garland admits that the types of changes that have
taken place could not have occurred but for changes in society itself (i.e.,
communities), even if politicians, the media, and corporations were able to
build upon such changes, he does not look to communities as a possible
regulating force for SCP.115
 Nonetheless, one of Garland’s arguments is that changes in late modernity
“eventually resulted in settled cultural effects.”116  Culture effects and affects
the changes that have occurred.117  Most importantly for the model presented
in this Article is the strong link that culture (and therefore community) has
with crime control.  This relationship, however, is not a one-way street, and,
as such, the most appropriate source for regulating SCP in mass private space
is the community.118
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119. Cf. Scott, supra note 47, at 417 (“[I]t is the community, as opposed to say, territory, that
[police] are policing, . . . [and] it is the interests of the community, and not just the government,
that police ought to take into account when policing[.]”). 
120. Garland, supra note 47, at 12.
121. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 53, at 159; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 80-
81.
122. Garland, supra note 47, at 12.
123. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 42 (recognizing that society’s understanding of facts
and values is the society’s “very identity” and is subject to shift over time, rather than being
some fixed exogenous truth).
124. As Vincent, supra note 2, at 221, discusses: “The shopping mall is the cathedral of
contemporary culture.  It is the focus of what little social life many of us share with others.”
Thus, because the mall is so central to social life and culture in many places, the rules that
determine who may or may not enter the mall are an expression of who is deemed worthy to
partake in a central component of modern public life.
125. David Nelken, Whom Can You Trust: The Future of Comparative Criminology, in THE
FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 220, 221 (David Nelken ed., 1994).
Additionally, it is at the community level that crime and SCP manifests
itself.119  While there is a myriad of data on aggregate criminal activity, crime
and the fear of crime manifests itself in the forms of discrete events affecting
individuals living in a given community, and the reality and fear of crime has
become part of everyday life in many communities.120  Similarly, while the
emergence of SCP or mass private space can arguably be examined across
nations or as a phenomenon of late modernity,121 it also is something that
affects individuals and communities.  Some groups of people are excluded or
feel unwelcome in a particular mass private space.  Just as crime has become
a part of everyday life for many people, so too has being the subject or target
of SCP in mass private space.122  Thus crime victims and those who fear crimes
are part of the community that should be given a say as to the nature and extent
of SCP in mass private property.
2. SCP as an Indirect Expression of Community Values
There is another reason for making the community the primary regulator of
SCP in mass private space.  SCP involves core and fundamental issues as to
what weight should be accorded certain values.123  Given that both crime and
SCP take place in real communities — not in the abstract —  and that a mass
private property is part of a community, the nature and degree of SCP that an
owner of a mass private property may implement will not only affect the
community greatly but, in a sense, will be an expression of the values of the
community.124  Further, many aspects “about crime control which purport to
be universal in fact take their sense and limits of applicability from . . . cultural
connections.”125
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126. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 42.
127. It is here that a crucial difference between public and private property emerges.  While
there may well be good reason for protecting freedom of expression on private property, the
interests involved are not the same as when the property is public.  With public property there
is the special concern about the government’s quashing of disfavored speech.  See R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate
[speech] based upon hostility — or favoritism — towards the underlying message expressed.”);
Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and
Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2446 (2003) (“[L]imiting official opportunities to
suppress disfavored speech is one of the important purposes served by . . . the First
Amendment.”).  While there may be concerns about a private interest quashing expression, even
in post-modern society, government maintains a monopoly on enforcement that is qualitatively
and quantitatively different from any private interest.
128. While pecuniary concerns may overwhelmingly be the focus of owners and operators
of mass private space, they may not be the only ones.  Certainly where the owner is an
individual or a company that is controlled by one or a small number of individuals, it is not
unreasonable that the owner would not want people who are wearing garb expressing a hateful
message or simply an insensitive one on his property, such as somebody who appears in Nazi
regalia either because he subscribes to the tenets of Nazism or because he gets amusement out
of it.  In the case of public property, one’s right to so express himself or herself ought to be
protected lest the government have the power to allow the expression of one viewpoint over
another.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722-23 (2000).  However, the owner of a piece
of mass private property may be highly offended by such a display (or may not wish to allow
such offensive display), and there is an argument that he should not have to tolerate such on his
property.  See Winnie Hu, A Message of Peace on 2 Shirts Touches Off Hostilities at a Mall,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at B1 (reporting a case in which the operator of a mall sought to
expel a patron who was wearing a sweatshirt that expressed opposition to America’s fighting
There is no objective answer to how much weight to give to the safety of
easily victimized members of society (or their subjective feeling of security)
relative to the right of access to community members that are easily
marginalized.126  And for any set of variables, there will be a number of
competing values for which the correct balance admits to no predetermined
formula: the freedom of one to express himself against the interest in being
able to have a setting free from offensive conduct and speech;127 the interest
of people in congregating in a large group in a fixed area versus the interests
of those who wish to walk comfortably around the space and the interest of the
business owners in not having the entranceways to their shops impeded; the
interest of teenagers in having a place to go (and perhaps the interest of their
parents in their having a place to go that is safer than local neighborhood
streets) versus the desire that some adults might have in going to a place that
is free from teenagers.  In addition, the interest of the owner of the mass
private space in creating an environment that is in her (and her tenants’)
pecuniary interest, as well as one consistent with her ethical and personal
concerns,128 may clash with the interest of those who wish to take advantage
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
788 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:759
a war in Iraq).
129. For a definition of those boundaries, see supra text accompanying notes 91-94 and infra
Part V.A.
130. See Duff & Marshall, supra note 29, at 21 (arguing that beyond the costs and benefits
of SCP on different groups, “[w]e should also attend . . . to [SCP measures’] meanings: to the
attitudes, the conceptions of citizens and their mutual relationships, that they manifest.”).
131. See id.
132. This reference to the expressive use of punishment, is not meant to indicate that the
community affirmatively takes steps to punish with the purpose of expressing itself.  Rather,
expressive use of punishment refers to the notion that, when society punishes, whatever the
impetus for such, that it inevitably expresses itself.  Cf. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN SOCIETY 56 (W.D. Halls trans., Free Press 1984) (1893) (recognizing that methods
and degrees of punishment reflect the culture of a society); Simon, supra note 10, at 231-32
(same).
of the space.
In addition, within certain bounds,129 the extent and nature of SCP
techniques employed in mass private space are matters that not only are best
decided by the community in question but also are important for the
community to decide.130  It is not just that the community is best situated to
evaluate the various concerns that are present within it, but that the community
can express itself by regulating the relationships between spaces that may be
the major public place of interaction, the people who may wish to enter the
space, and the risks to and fears of those individuals invited to enter.131
In that a community by definition expresses itself by its manner of
punishment, so too does it express itself by where it draws the line between
safety levels and degrees of freedom and between property rights and access
rights.132  This argument treads closely to discussing mass private space as
though it were public space.  There is, however, a key distinction.  Under the
proposal put forth herein, communities or their representatives would not
directly regulate conduct.  Rather they would be giving more or less leeway
to the owner of private property to regulate conduct solely on the property in
question based upon the particular circumstances of the community and its
ethics and values.  Additionally, the boundaries alluded to in Part III, supra,
and detailed in Part V, infra, distinguish this model from one that treats mass
private property as purely public space.
3. The Objective and Subjective Effects of SCP on Different Segments of
Society
Another justification for regulation of SCP at the community level stems
from the fact that “the burdens and benefits of a particular technique for
preventing or controlling crime (such as SCP) fall on different parts of
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133. Joanna Shapland, Situational Prevention: Social Values and Social Viewpoints, in
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 113,
115.
134. See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 163; Shapland, supra note 133, at 115-16.
135. Shapland, supra note 133, at 115.
136. Id. at 115-16.
137. See id.
138. See Wakefield, supra note 12, for a description of three such properties and the
different persons that tend to use these facilities, as well as differences in the types of persons
who were likely to be excluded or to be the subject of other SCP measures.
139. For example, all other factors being equal, mass private space is likely to play a more
important role in cold-weather cities where most people would rather shop or spend leisure time
in an indoor facility than in a warmer climate.  So too, one might expect that in a cold-weather
city there would be more mass private properties, thus providing patrons (and potentially
excluded individuals) alternative locations.  Conversely it might be argued that exclusion from
a mass private space in a cold-weather city in winter may be overly oppressive because the
excluded person may then be faced with spending time either at home or in inclement weather,
whereas the person excluded from such an establishment in a city with milder weather is more
likely to have the option of walking around or shopping in the public downtown area.
140. Garland, supra note 47, at 14.
society.”133  Consequently, the benefits, costs, ethics, and other consequences
of SCP cannot be evaluated in a vacuum; one must evaluate these from one or
more perspectives.134  Indeed, Shapland calls for “examin[ing] what SCP looks
like from each perspective.”135  For example, SCP might be a net gain from the
government’s perspective or from the standpoint of those who can afford
protective devices or are allowed to enter mass private spaces without much
problem but a net loss for the poor and/or excluded members of society.136
Nevertheless, these types of multiperspective analyses of the benefits and
detriments of SCP in mass private property (and elsewhere) are dependent
upon the nature of the mass private space and upon the effects of different SCP
measures in various types of properties.137  Because of this dependent
relationship, the analysis of community variability that the literature has
generally ignored is of central importance in properly analyzing SCP in mass
private space.  The role that a given mass private property plays in a
community depends not only on the characteristics of the property138 but also
upon the demographics, location, and other aspects of the community in which
it is located, as well as upon any other communities from which it draws
patrons.139  The role that such a mass space occupies also depends on crime
rates in the area, whether or not alternative locations to the mass private
property exist, either in other mass private spaces or in public places, and other
factors.  As Garland acknowledges, “SCP has no fixed ideological meaning or
determinate fixed political affiliations,”140 while Shapland argues “that SCP
does not itself contain the ethical boundaries and constraints necessary to set
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141. See Shapland, supra note 133, at 121.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Kleinig, supra note 50, at 48; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 89.
145. Shapland, supra note 133, at 117.
146. See Alysa B. Freeman, Comment, Go to the Mall with My Parents? A Constitutional
Analysis of the Mall of America’s Juvenile Curfew, 102 DICK. L. REV. 481, 481-82 (1998)
(discussing the Mall of America’s barring unaccompanied juveniles from the mall during certain
hours).
acceptable limits to the choice of techniques to apply.  SCP merely provides
a palette of techniques.”141  Thus, the impact of SCP in mass private space can
be determined only with regard to both the manner in which it is employed and
also to the relationship between a given mass private space and the community
relevant to that space; one cannot make a general evaluation of SCP in mass
private space that is valid for all times and places.142  Many scholars seem to
be aware of these facets but do not look to them as a source for making, to
paraphrase Shapland, difficult choices.143
The meaning and impact of SCP measures employed in a given space are
both objectively and subjectively contingent upon the communities where the
space is located and upon the ones it serves.  They are objectively contingent,
in the sense that the characteristics of the community, the mass private space
in question, and the nature of the SCP employed have different impacts in
different communities.144  That is, the actual effect on crime and access varies
depending on each of these three factors.  The effects are also subjectively
contingent, as the individual and collective experiences of a given community
are a partial determinant of how members of that community experience SCP
measures that an owner of mass private space employs.145
For example, consider the objective and subjective implications of
excluding people under a certain age at certain hours from a shopping mall.
Suppose that the mall is essentially the only public place where most of the
community’s senior citizens can go, in that many do not drive and there is no
convenient public transportation for them.  Also assume, however, that the
mall is located in a community where there are other choices available for
young people; perhaps other malls are too far away for many elderly or
physically challenged persons to reach given their relative immobility, but
which teenagers excluded from this space could reach without great
difficulty.146  Objectively and subjectively speaking, the positive impact on the
seniors and others who have limited mobility would likely be quite strong
while the negative impact on the excluded teenagers would probably be small.
The former group may be particularly susceptible to crime, and excluding
youths may lower the risk of the elderly and physically challenged being
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147. Cf. Zedner, supra note 32, at 163-66 (discussing situational crime prevention as
involving steps that attempt to make people safer and that make them feel safer and the fact that
accomplishing one of these goals will not necessarily accomplish the other, as well as arguing
that in some cases more visible safety measures may make people feel less safe by making them
more aware of the risk of crime).
148. See Freeman, supra note 146, at 483 (describing the implementation of such a policy
at the Mall of America).
victims of crime (objective) and may make them feel safer (subjective) while
at the mall.147  If such SCP is not employed, the seniors and those with
disabilities will have to choose between foregoing engaging in public
interaction and exposing themselves to risk and fear.  The excluded group has
other options (objective) and also may not feel particularly stigmatized by their
exclusion (subjective) because they are not being kept out of a space to which
their peers have access and are being kept out for the protection and peace of
mind of the elderly, a purpose that is arguably not a stigmatizing one for
youths.  That is, in some cases the excluded group will not be stigmatized by
being excluded.
Consider a second scenario in which, as in the above example, a mall
engages in a policy whereby no one under a certain age may enter unless
accompanied by an adult.148  Assume also that this mall is in a poor
neighborhood and that the youths who live in this neighborhood do not have
reasonable access to a similar facility.  Assume that there are other malls
located some distance away, in wealthier neighborhoods that are too far away
for the excluded youths to reach, but that the young people in those
neighborhoods are situated such that they can frequent these other venues,
which do not have a similar exclusionary policy.  In this case, members of the
excluded group are denied the only available shopping or public interaction
experience (objective) and may feel stigmatized, knowing that their peers in
wealthier districts have access to shopping malls or other facilities to which
they do not (subjective).  
The variability of the communities in which the mass private spaces are
located and the relationship between the spaces and the communities in the
first and second examples show that, objectively and subjectively, the
consequences of the exclusionary policy will differ from the perspective of
both excluded and nonexcluded or protected groups.  These examples support
the argument that one cannot derive a broad substantive formula that will
apply to a given SCP practice in a given type of mass private property that is
applicable to all communities.  As Shapland describes it:
SCP is not the kind of crime reduction initiative that can be
delivered top-down in a uniform manner . . . .  
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149. Shapland, supra note 133, at 121-22; see also Johnson, supra note 48, at 602
(“Participation in community ‘crime prevention efforts is not merely desirable but necessary.
Police and other specialists cannot control crime; they need all the help the community can give
them.’” (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS,
COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION 7 (1973))).
150. See infra Part V for a further discussion of both what constitutes the relative community
and issues about decision making, representation, and problems of externalities.
This means that SCP has to be usable for those implementing it
locally.  It is they who need to understand the palette and its
applicability to their situation.  It is also they who will need to work
through the ethical implications of their chosen SCP activity.149
Therefore, given that there are so many variables, the community in which the
mass private property is located is best suited to make a determination as to
what types of SCP practices are and are not acceptable.150
V. Creating a Framework for Regulating SCP in Mass Private Property in
Terms of Its Dualistic Nature, Its Role in the Community, and Community
Values
Having argued in previous sections that regulation of SCP in mass private
property involves taking account of both the fact that the property is privately
owned and is put to use much as public property is, and also that such
regulation should be undertaken by the community, this Part of the Article
builds a framework for such regulation that takes account of these aspects of
mass private property and SCP.  Moreover, in addition to substantive
differences that argue in favor of different communities having the power to
regulate the substance of SCP that owners of mass private property may
employ, there is also a procedural variability from place to place.  That is,
different communities may wish to have not only different substantive
standards of permissible SCP but also wish to have different procedural
mechanisms for the formulation of such standards.  Despite this variability and
flexibility, the model presented can provide a broad framework as to the role
of and the limits upon community involvement.  This framework has three
components: (1) boundaries, (2) scope of relevant populations, and (3)
mechanisms.
Part V.A discusses the first component.  This component calls for placing
boundaries on community decision-making.  That is, while the present analysis
argues for giving communities broad discretion to regulate SCP, at the same
time there should be limits on such community regulation that are imposed by
institutions not controlled by the community itself.  Next, Part V.B discusses
the second component, which involves a determination of who should and
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151. See Klear, supra note 43, at 589.  Compare Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)
(holding that there is no federal constitutional right of access to a shopping mall because the
mall is private property), with PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)
(holding that notwithstanding Lloyd, states may exercise their police power to prevent property
owners from excluding those seeking access).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000). 
153. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1373-83 (discussing various state and federal statutes and
cases involving exclusion and access to places of public accommodation).
154. Gray & Gray, supra note 66, at 76-77 (footnote omitted).  By way of contrast, the
should not count as a member of the community for purposes of the proposed
framework.  This Part explores the challenges of delineating geographically
and demographically who is in a given community vis-a-vis a given mass
private space and suggests tools for meeting these challenges.  Lastly, Part V.C
discusses the third component, mechanisms for diagnosing and remedying
breakdowns of community decision-making.  This Part asserts that one cannot
expect community decision-making to function ideally in all cases.  This Part
provides a methodology for evaluating when community decision making has
broken down and suggests multiple remedies for such breakdowns.
A. Boundaries
As used here, boundaries provide upper and lower limits on what
communities may allow or forbid regarding SCP in mass private property and
are determined in light of a mass private property’s dual public/private nature.
The term “boundaries” is used here to argue that extracommunity actors
should be able to draw lines as to what the community may and may not do.
The upper limit would prohibit communities from imposing overly restrictive
barriers on a mass private property owner’s use of SCP, while the lower limit
would prohibit the community from ceding too much authority to the property
owner to employ SCP.
1. Existing Boundaries
The United States Supreme Court has essentially delegated the power to
rule on the right to exclude from mass private space (and to employ other
forms of SCP) to Congress and to the states.151  As such, in the United States,
regulation of SCP has taken place in the form of federal regulation such as the
1964 Civil Rights Act152 as well as through state court rulings and state
legislation.153  While this creates variation among jurisdictions, “[t]he message
of the contemporary American cases, although as yet far from uniform, thus
suggests a resurgence of concern that the territorial control of large-scale
private owners should not be permitted to overreach the essential liberties of
the citizen.”154
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United Kingdom has different boundaries in place than the United States (and most other
common law countries).  Id. at 60.  Compare CIN Props. Ltd. v. Rawlins, [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. 130
(C.A.) (Eng.), with PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74.  Under Rawlins, in the United Kingdom the owner
of mass private property can arbitrarily exclude whomever he likes and need not make a
showing of good cause to do so. See Rawlins, [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. at 134 (refusing to accept the
reasoning that “members of the public are privileged visitors whose privilege is revocable only
upon misbehaviour” (quoting Harrison v. Carswell, [1975] 62 D.L.R. 68, 74 (Can.) (Laskin,
C.J., dissenting))); see also Gray & Gray, supra note 66, at 48-49.  This holding “contrasts
remarkably with the legal stance now adopted in many other parts of the common law world
with respect to quasi-public property.”  Gray & Gray, supra note 66, at 60.  Further, the coming
into force of the Human Right’s Act may lead English courts to revisit the Rawlins decision and
reach an outcome consistent with other common law jurisdictions.  While the main point of this
Article is to focus on SCP in the United States, it is important to recognize that the boundaries
that the United States has currently chosen are not the only possible choices for a modern
nation.
155. Cf. Duff & Marshall, supra note 29, at 19 (discussing “side constrained
consequentialism” in connection with SCP).  Under the theory of side constrained
consequentialism, even if one is trying to maximize social goods (through whatever
mechanism), there may be constraints that must be respected even if maximizing social goods
would call for not so respecting them: the constraints “trump.”  Id.  For example, if person A
has two luxury cars while person B has one run-down car, it is likely that forcing person A to
give one of her cars to person B would increase social good, since person B would likely benefit
more from selling one of A’s cars than A would feel from losing one of her cars.  Yet side
constrained consequentialism would say that the value of not simply taking away an
individual’s property would trump the increase in social value from forcing A to give B A’s
extra luxury car.  Similarly, in the present formulation for regulating SCP on mass private
space, boundaries trump community preferences.
156. See infra Part V.C.
157. Callies & Breemer, supra note 74, at 39; see also O. Lee Reed, What Is Property?, 41
AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 463 (2004) (“There is increasing conviction that the material rise of the West
during the last 300 years has been directly attributable to property’s legal institution . . . .”).
2. Envisioning Boundaries
There should be both substantive and procedural limits on what measures
a community should allow and what limits it may impose vis-à-vis SCP in
mass private property.  This part provides a framework for substantive limits
or boundaries.155  Procedural limitations inhere in the discussion of the role
that communities should play in being the primary arbiters of SCP in mass
private property.156
The concept of private property has played a long and important role in the
legal history of the United States.157  At the same time, modern court cases and
commentary recognize that private property should not always and
automatically trump social justice, fairness, and equal opportunity and access.
While conceptions of what limits can be put on an individual’s use of his or
her property may change as new forms of property arise, this change calls only
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158. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81; Vincent, supra note 2, at 222.
159. See generally Epstein, supra note 2, at 48-50 (noting that requiring an owner of mass
private space to allow uses generally associated with public space will impose costs on the
owner, which unlike with public space, cannot be passed on via taxation).
160. Richard Epstein, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A Common Sense
Reply to Professor Ayres, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 837 (1998).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
162. See generally Callies & Breemer, supra note 74; Epstein, supra note 2 (asserting that
merely because a property owner chooses to admit some people, that does not mean the property
owner has given up entirely the right to exclude anyone).
163. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old Versus New
Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 83-85 (2000) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence in terms of the property owner’s investment-backed
expectations).
164. Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 74.  To the extent that the community would limit the
mass private property owner’s right to exclude, Epstein’s words bear some relevance: “[I]t is
difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to exclude is rejected.”  Epstein,
supra note 2, at 22.
165. Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 74; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 85.
for an ongoing reevaluation of the property and constitutional rights of owners
of less traditional forms of property, not for the jettisoning of the concept of
private property once it is put to a particular use.158  Moreover, treating mass
private property as public property has severe fairness and economic
consequences.159  Those who have invested in private property would
effectively lose their investment, and those who might wish to invest in mass
private property might be stripped of their incentive to do so.160  Thus,
although the model presented here envisions mass private property as
qualitatively different from other types of private property, the dual
public/private quality inherent in the model allows traditional property law to
serve as a beacon, even if not as an exact marker, in setting the boundary on
a community’s right to limit SCP.
The substantive boundaries are rooted in the dual nature of mass private
space as both public and private property.161  As private property, there are
certain rights that the owner retains irrespective of the fact that she has opened
the space to general public use.162  Unlike public property, the owner has made
an investment in the property and has a personal stake.163  As such, the
community should not be allowed to so limit what measures the owner of the
property may undertake that the property ceases to resemble property.164
On the other hand, as a space open to the public for general use, there are
certain forms of SCP that are inherently inconsistent with the property’s use
as a space open to the public.165  These limitations will not be the same as
those which would apply were the property truly public, where the issue would
concern unacceptable government coercion.  Rather, while drawing to some
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166. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
167. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”); Von Hirsch &
Shearing, supra note 2, at 86.
168. Cf. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-83 (“[T]he determination whether a state law unlawfully
infringes a landowner’s property in violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of
whether the restriction on private property ‘forces some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
169. See Vincent, supra note 2, at 238.
170. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000a (2000)) (outlawing discrimination or segregation on
the basis of race, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation).
degree on the fact that mass private space resembles public property, the
central guiding principle in setting up a substantive boundary on unacceptable
SCP is that the practices cannot be inconsistent with a facility to which the
entire community and beyond — the entire world in fact — is invited to enter.
The model put forth here does not seek to formulate a detailed reservoir of
property rights that an owner of mass private property retains so as to delineate
which controls on SCP are within communities’ purviews.  Nonetheless, the
fact that a property owner opens his premises to general public use does not,
as many theorists have argued, turn private property into public property.
Under the model, the owner retains some portion of the bundle of rights
associated with private property, even if the public is generally invited to enter
for no particular purpose.166  Conversely, because this invitation to the public
gives mass private space certain characteristics and functions akin to those of
public property, the bundle of rights that the owner retains is markedly
different and necessarily smaller than those retained even by the owner of
private property that is open to the public for a particular use, such as a
restaurant.167
The traditional view that the right to exclude is inherent in the concept of
private property does play a role in setting some boundary upon the limits that
communities can impose on SCP measures that owners may employ.168  On the
other end are boundaries on what SCP exclusion and behavioral standards the
community may allow the owner of mass private space to impose.  This
boundary is rooted in the fact that the property is so public in nature.169  So, not
only may an owner not be given authority to exclude based upon race, religion,
or nationality — bases that would be illegitimate even with private property
open to the public only for a specific use170 — but arguably the owner should
not be able to exclude groups generally afforded less protection than those just
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171. See ELY, supra note 94, at 76 (“Paragraph three [of the famous Carolene Products
footnote 4] suggests that the Court should also concern itself with what majorities do to
minorities, particularly mentioning laws ‘directed at’ religious, national, and racial minorities
and those infected by prejudice against them.” (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938))).
172. See Scott, supra note 47, at 435 (“Determining what is a community and who speaks
for it is more than just a semantic exercise.  To be sure, the term ‘community’ has varied
definitions: (1) a group of people living in the same locality and under the same government,
(2) the district or locality in which such a group of people lives, (3) a group of people having
listed, such as teenagers or the homeless, without at least providing a sound
basis for doing so.171
These bases are illustrative, not comprehensive, and it is not possible to
enumerate all the bases for exclusion that fall beyond this boundary.  While it
is important that such a boundary exists, given the broad range that the model
proposes in terms of community regulation, the territory that this boundary
demarcates is quite limited; the bulk of the substance of what SCP measures
an owner may employ should be in the province of community regulation.
Moreover, even the boundaries are somewhat contingent, but the important
difference is that, unlike the range of choices within the boundaries, the
boundaries themselves should not be left to the political choice of
communities.  They are properly the province of constitutional and common
law court decisions (or perhaps broader political choice, such as at the nation,
state, or county — as opposed to the village, town or, city — level).  The
precise boundary against incursion into property rights cannot be delineated
in the abstract.  The important point for this analysis is that such a boundary
does exist and that it clearly falls somewhere outside allowing the community
to impose limits on the property owner’s ability to use SCP that would be valid
only if the mass private property were treated as public property.
Notwithstanding its general openness to the public, mass private property
ought to be treated as a form of private property, and this limits the restrictions
that the community may place on the property owner’s use of SCP.
B. Scope of Relevant Populations
To this point, this Article has dealt with community without addressing the
problem of defining the contours of the community that is to take part in
regulating a particular mass private space.  The actual location of mass private
property provides a starting point for defining the relevant community that
should regulate SCP on such property.  However, a proper analysis requires
examination of multiple factors.
There is no exact demarcation of the bounds of community that applies in
all circumstances.172  Rather, there are two primary criteria by which to
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common interests, similarity, or identity, (4) society as a whole.”).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Cf. id. at 433 (“One dimension of the broad community justice approach is that the
systems in which offenders are adjudicated ought to take better account of the desires, needs,
perspectives, and interests of the community most directly affected by the offenders’ conduct.”).
176. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 172-75. 
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 610 (“The group organizers must provide opportunities
for all groups or individuals to participate in the community-wide program (while allowing
groups to retain their identity if this is important to them).”); Shapland, supra note 133, at 117
(discussing the burden of exclusion “from the point of view of local communities near the
evaluate scopes of communities: geographic and demographic.173  It is
important that the relevant geographic and demographic communities that are
affected by SCP on mass private property are represented in the decision-
making process for implementing regulation of SCP within the outer bounds
of appropriate community regulation.174  Only if the affected communities,
defined in both aspects, have a place at the table, will regulation of SCP be
able to take account of the costs and benefits that SCP measures will have on
the affected population.175  Moreover, regulation of SCP will serve the further
step of expressing and reinforcing the views, preferences, ethics, and mores of
the relevant communities only is the relevant communities are represented in
the decision-making process.
1. Geographic Community
The above issue raises two subsidiary questions: (1) how to determine the
geographic dimensions of the relevant community, and (2) once the first
determination is made, how to construct a mechanism that effects the proper
representation.
There are no exact geographic boundaries that delineate the relevant
community.176  Further, there will be no way to determine precisely the
location of the populace who wishes to frequent a particular mass private
property.177  Also, the question of how many users of a mass private space
need come from a given community (or what percentage of that community
need use the mass private space) for the community to be deemed sufficiently
important vis-à-vis the space and to be part of the decision-making process
does not lend itself to a precise numerical answer.178  There are, however,
certain fundamental principles that should be considered when defining the
relevant geographic community.
First, a mass private property located in a particular city, town, or village
will likely serve people from adjacent and even nonadjacent municipalities.179
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mall”); Robert White, Youth Crime, Community Development, and Social Justice, in YOUTH IN
CITIES: A CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 138, 155-56, 158 (Marta Tienda & William Julius
Wilson eds., 2002) (“Acknowledgment of the rights, worth, and dignity of youth is integral to
successful approaches to problem behavior.  Young people share many commonalities,
including lack of adequate resources, a dearth of youth-friendly amenities, frequent harassment
from authority figures, fear of being victimized, and exclusion from decision-making processes.
These circumstances constitute a recipe for resentment, frustration, alienation, and
retaliation. . . . The provision of legitimate alternative activities is a vital ingredient for
successful youth crime prevention. . . . [T]he first task of crime prevention is to rebuild
communities, and as part of this to foster the ideas of solidarity and cooperation.  This can
initially be approached through the democratization of decision making at the neighborhood
level, and by inclusion of young people, especially young offenders, in the process.”).
180. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 610.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Cf. ELY, supra note 94, at 83 (discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV as ensuring that those who make the decisions in a given jurisdiction — namely a
state — do not discriminate against citizens from outside the jurisdiction, who by definition are
politically powerless within the jurisdiction in question).
Therefore, simply nominating the governing unit wherein the property is
located as the decision-making body of the relevant community will not satisfy
the geographic component of the analysis.  Rather, all those whom SCP in
mass private space is likely to affect should be party to formulating
regulations.180
Second, certainly usage of mass private space does not have to be
undertaken by anything close to one hundred percent of a community for that
community to be relevant, because such a standard would effectively rule out
all communities, including the one in which the property is located.181
Conversely, the fact that a small percentage or number from a given
community might wish access to the mass private property is not sufficient for
such community to have a say in regulation under the model, as this will likely
include such a broad swath that the result would swallow the concept of a
communitarian model of SCP regulation.182
Third, the geographic community wherein the mass private property is
located should not decide which geographic and demographic communities
should be allowed input into regulation of SCP in such space.183  There is
obviously a conflict of interest because allowing other communities to take
part will necessarily dilute the input of the community in question.  It would
be equivalent to allowing voters to decide who else is eligible to vote in an
election.  Instead, just as boundaries need to be demarcated by some authority
outside the community, so too must the question of community participation
be decided at a broader level than the community itself, either legislatively or
by judicial decree.
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184. See id. (noting that for some, community — in the context of community policing —
means a majority or plurality of those who work or live in a relatively small geographic area,
whereas for others, it means the group of persons who would be affected by a particular
decision involving this issue).
185. See Scott, supra note 47, at 435 (discussing possible ways in which to demarcate the
boundaries of a community). 
186. See Gray & Gray, supra note 66, at 66; Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940,
90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1087 (2005) (“To those who tend to be skeptical of the exercise of local
power because it has traditionally been used to exclude marginalized groups, Sandel’s politics
will appear retrograde.  And to those who believe that one cannot effectively protect local
economies from the expansion of global markets without serious social welfare losses, the
protectionist economic policy that Sandel celebrates will appear naïve.”); Shapland, supra note
133, at 117; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88-90; Wakefield, supra note 12, at 130-
Deciding what percentage of members of a given community must use a
mass private space before such a community will be awarded a say in
regulating SCP therein is essentially a first-order policy question, not
something for which there is a precise answer, such as thirty percent.184  Other
than saying that the guiding principle should be whether a given community
has a significant stake in SCP policies in a given mass private property (an
admittedly slippery formulation), any policy that this Article advocated would
necessarily be a matter of the author’s opinion as opposed to an answer that
would help policy makers make a choice.
Nonetheless, to say that no precise answer can be given in the abstract, is
not to admit that a meaningful analysis of the relevant geographic community
is futile.185  Although it is not possible to gauge exactly how many or what
percentage of people from a given community use a given mass private
property, reasonable estimates can be made through surveys at mass private
spaces as well as within the communities themselves.
Two additional points are in order.  First, the instant proposal is put forth
as a starting point for further academic analysis and policy implementation, not
as an ultimate solution.  As such, if policy makers do adopt the approach
advocated herein, over time the question of whether a community should or
should not be included will become a workable, even if always a contested,
matter.
2. Demographic Community
In some ways, delineating demographic community is more problematic
than geographic community, or at least more controversial.  Much of the
commentary criticizing SCP exclusions from mass private space points to the
fact that the most marginalized groups are the most likely to be targets of
SCP.186  Identifying and including marginalized groups, however, is an easier
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31.
187. Cf. ELY, supra note 94, at 75-76 (discussing the famous Carolene Products footnote
4, seen as ensuring that insular minorities are not excluded from representative decision
making).
188. See id. at 77.  For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part V.C.
189. See Wakefield, supra note 12, at 130-31.
190. See id.
191. See Gray & Gray, supra note 66, at 66; Mulligan, supra note 39, at 541 (“Even when
clothing does not display a controversial political message, shopping malls routinely expel
shoppers for their attire.  An article in the online magazine Salon details the growing trend of
malls forbidding shoppers from wearing ‘gang related’ clothing while on the premises.  One St.
Louis area mall even expelled rap star Nelly from mall property for wearing a ‘do-rag,’ which
was an item of clothing the mall’s dress code expressly forbade.  Because it is exceedingly
difficult to tell exactly what gang clothing is, the real purpose of the policy appears to be to give
mall security carte blanche to expel black youths from mall premises, rather than to prevent
gang activity.  Some critics agree, charging that the anti-gang clothing policies are actually a
form of ‘ethnic cleansing’ aimed at young black males.” (footnotes omitted)); Michael Myers,
Roundtable, Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law Enforcement Inconsistent with Good Police-
Community Relations?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363, 391-92 (2000) (“We have substituted a
War on Poverty with a war on the poor.  There are many things they can do in the war on the
poor that are constitutional, that have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.  In law
enforcement matters, the so-called Broken Windows theory is the linchpin of the war on the
poor; the war on the homeless; the war on the vagrants; the war to bring decent citizens back
to ‘our public spaces’; the war to ‘take back the streets’ and subways; the war to make sure that
‘aggressive panhandlers’ are not hanging around the ATM when you withdraw money, whether
or not they intend to rob you; the war against truancy by picking up students on their way to
school, even if they are just stragglers, rather than truants; and the war on squeegee people.”);
Wakefield, supra note 12, at 130-31.
task than delineating relevant geographic communities.
Groups such as racial and ethnic minorities and the poor, assuming they are
part of the geographic community, would by definition be included in any
mechanism by which a community would make decisions regulating SCP on
mass private space, whether it be legislatively or by referendum.  That is to
say, it is unlikely that anyone would put forth an argument (and if they did it
would fall on deaf ears) that minorities or those earning less than a certain
amount per year cannot take part in decisions based on such status.187  Beyond
this, however, there is surely an issue as to whether these groups would have
sufficient representation either with regard to a direct referendum or in terms
of electoral politics for their concerns to be heard.188  This is an issue addressed
in the next Part.  Also, there are some groups within the geographic
community that may face resistance to their inclusion in direct community
decision making or to their choosing community representatives.189  The
groups that stand out in this regard are the homeless or vagrants, persons with
criminal records, and youths.190  SCP may particularly target these groups.191
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192.  See Kang & Cuff, supra note 21, at 122 (“An individual could also be discouraged
from entry because her identity is linked to recent context trails, such as a visit to the gun store
or negative reputation in a permanent financial, criminal, marketing, or other ‘blacklist’
database.” (footnote omitted)); Wakefield, supra note 12, at 131-32.
193. The concern regarding the lack of representation of affected populations pervades many
public policy issues, such as the age of consent for sexual relations, the drinking age, and the
driving age, all of which are determined without the direct input of those affected.  Similar
arguments could be made regarding a variety of policies that affect the homeless and those with
criminal records.
194. For further discussion, see infra Part V.C.
195. See, e.g., American Friends Service Committee, Criminal Justice, http://www.afsc.org/
issues/issues.php?id=323 (last visited Aug. 6, 2007); Homeless.org, http://homeless.org/do/
Home (last visited Aug. 6, 2007).
196. CASS SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 8 (2000).
It is admittedly a concern that those under a certain age neither have the
right to vote nor to take part in community meetings and that those who are
without established addresses may be de facto, even if not de jure,
disenfranchised.  Those individuals who have criminal records — also a
frequent target of SCP192 — may not have voting privileges, depending upon
the jurisdiction and the crimes for which they have been convicted.
The above concerns are certainly issues with which those who might wish
to take the analysis further will have to grapple if attempts to implement the
proposed approach are undertaken.  Nevertheless, the problems regarding lack
of representation of the groups just mentioned are not particular to SCP.193  It
may be that in some cases the question of lack of proper representation will
require politically insulated bodies to intervene.194  Alternatively, depending
upon the circumstances, the interests of these persons may be protected by
other individuals, as they have been with regard to issues other than SCP and
mass private space.
For example, parents certainly have a direct interest in the options open to
their children.  Various groups advocate on behalf of criminals, ex-convicts,
and the homeless.195  Moreover, communities may look beyond narrow self-
interest in setting policies, in that “people . . . may want . . . to act fairly,
and . . . to be seen to act fairly, . . . [and] may sacrifice their . . . self-interest
in order to be, or to appear, fair.”196  The extent to which communities will take
these interests into account will probably vary from community to community.
This approach likely will require some intervention, but not exclusive control,
by extracommunity decision makers, whether by courts or political actors that
are beholden to a wider constituency.
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197. INDEP. COMM’N ON POLICING FOR N. IR., supra note 97, at 40 (setting forth a model
whereby “the community participat[es] in its own policing” as an example of an area in which
a substantive solution was proposed).
198. See discussion supra Parts V.A-B.
199. See ELY, supra note 94, at 135.
200. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 137.
201. See id. (referring to this phenomenon as an incompletely theorized agreement).
C. Evaluating the Validity of Community Decision Making and Remedying
the Process When Necessary
This Article has set forth a primarily procedural solution to what scholars
and policy makers have generally tackled as a substantive problem.197
Nontheless, the framework does include substantive dimensions, in terms of
boundaries as well as mechanisms for defining the relevant community.198
Beyond this, although the analysis has pointed to the problem of defining
community, the issue of what amounts to legitimate community decision
making remains to be evaluated.  This matter may arise with SCP on mass
private property as well as with regard to any issue that affects
underrepresented groups because “[n]o matter how open the process, those
with the most votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the
expense of others, or otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account.”199
As mentioned above, the fact that a given group is underrepresented does
not necessarily mean that its interests will be ignored.  This fact is an
important consideration in determining when deliberative community
decisions may disregard legitimate interests of marginalized groups.  There are
two reasons that seemingly underrepresented groups’ interests will be
protected.
First, even if one were to assume that the members of the relevant
community will act in pure self-interest, it is possible that a plurality or even
majority may agree on a policy that favors a minority group.200  It may be the
case that people having different underlying beliefs about fundamental truths
agree on a lower-level outcome because this outcome is consistent with
achieving the important goals of each group.201  For example, a person might
believe that abortion amounts to the taking of a human life, but may think that
laws restricting abortion are counter-productive and only serve to increase
risky “black market” abortions.  Another person might believe that abortion
does not result in taking a human life and, therefore, should be wholly left to
the discretion of the pregnant woman.  Accordingly, these two individuals
have a fundamental disagreement about abortion, but both believe it should be
legal.  
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202. This example is merely illustrative.  Merchants that lease space in mass private property
may conclude that the presence of large groups of youths is a net loss as may be the case for
adult members of the community who do not have children younger than eighteen who would
wish to frequent the property.
203. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 46 (1999)
(“To advise a person or, for that matter, an entire society about the consequences of alternative
paths to the goal that the person or society has chosen is not to commit oneself to a moral
view. . . . [T]he expert, the scholar, does not choose the goal, but is confined to studying the
paths to the goal and so avoids moral issues.  If, as is sometimes the case, the goals of the
society are contested — some people want prosperity while others would sacrifice prosperity
to equality — then all the expert can do is show how particular policies advance or retard each
goal.  He cannot arbitrate between the goals unless they are intermediate goals — way stations
to a goal that commands a consensus.”).
204.  CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 22 (1997); see also POSNER,
supra note 203, at 46.
205. See POSNER, supra note 203, at 46; SUNSTEIN, supra note 204, at 22.
An example from the mass private property/SCP field involves those under
eighteen who may desire to access a given mass private space.  Parents may
wish that their children have access, because they may see the space as a good
social outlet and a safe setting.  Store owners, as well as other members of the
community, may conclude that excluding people based upon their age is bad
for the community because it excludes a portion of the population that would
spend money within the community and that, if excluded, will spend the
money outside the community.  Moreover, such extracommunity spending
may result in a detriment to merchants and others in the community that would
otherwise reap tax revenue or simply a stronger economy in the community
from the purchases of this underrepresented group.202  Thus, although those
under eighteen may have no direct say in the decision-making process and
their parents may not be a large enough group to protect their interests, their
interest in access may ultimately be protected due to the agreement on
outcome by different groups motivated to reach that outcome for different
reasons.
Second, recent studies have shown that even when acting in their self-
interest as economic maximizers, what individuals view as being in their self-
interest is not necessarily narrowly defined.203  Thus, “people, in their capacity
as political actors may attempt to satisfy altruistic or other-regarding desires
which diverge from self-interested preferences . . . .”204  In other words, to
some degree people get utility out of taking actions or supporting policies that
benefit others and not taking actions or opposing policies that harm others.205
In both the civil rights and criminal justice fields, the fact that popularly
elected governments have implemented policies that put limitations on
punishment or protect certain groups from discrimination is an example of the
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Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101-12213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
207. See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 132.
208. See ELY, supra note 94, at 75-76.
209. Cf. Scott, supra note 47, at 435 (“Determining what is a community and who speaks
for it is more than just a semantic exercise.”).
210. See discussion supra notes 94-95, 189-98 and accompanying text.
211. See ELY, supra note 94, at 135.
phenomena of those with the power to determine policy implementing choices
that further goes beyond their narrow self-interest.206 
Admittedly, there are weaknesses in the reliance on this type of protection.
For example, the United States (as well as the United Kingdom and some other
countries) certainly have become more punitive in the last several decades and
more willing to implement SCP policies that fall most harshly on marginalized
groups.207  Also, the extent of unselfish behavior obviously varies from person
to person and from issue to issue.  Some people may donate a large percentage
of their income to charity while others will not.  Moreover, there is no way to
measure the exact amount of utility maximization present in a society that goes
beyond pure self-interest, in general or with regard to SCP on mass private
property.  The fact that representative bodies have passed legislation protecting
non-majority groups, however, demonstrates that one cannot simply rebut the
call for community regulation of SCP on mass private property by asserting
that, in any community, there are minority groups that will be harmed by
policies implemented by the majority.208
With the above in mind, the issue becomes to what extent, within the
boundaries previously discussed, a community, as defined herein, should be
the sole arbiter of what SCP measures may be taken by an owner of mass
private space.209  The model presented here posits that under ideal conditions,
members or representatives of the community should formulate such
regulation.  As previously noted, however, communities or their
representatives will not always function properly or fairly.210
This raises two issues: determining when the community falls short of being
an ideal arbiter and what to do when it does so.  In terms of not functioning
ideally, this model looks at this as a procedural issue, rooted in the concepts
with which this Part began.  That is to say, the power structure of the
community may be such that some groups are simply harmed based on power
differential combined with the self-interest of a majority or concentrated
minority.211  And as mentioned earlier, one of the guideposts for this portion
of the analysis is examining the dual aspects of mass private space as private
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212. See supra Part III.
213. See ELY, supra note 94, at 135.
214. See supra Part V.A.
215. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra
note 94, at 76.
216.  See ELY, supra note 94, at 73-74; Adam Crawford, The Partnership Approach to
Community Crime Prevention: Corporatism at the Local Level?, 3 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES
[SOC. & LEG. S.] 497, 502 (1994) (U.K.) (noting that some private groups may hold particular
sway, especially of public/private partnerships, which play an important policy formation role
in late modernity).  This type of dysfunction might occur if a determined majority or even a
plurality were able to exercise power so as to reap benefits at the expense of those outside such
bloc. 
217. ELY, supra note 94, at 135.
218. See id. at 75-76.
property and also as a facility generally open to the public in a manner that
other private property is not.212
To be clear on this point, one cannot conclude that the community decision-
making mechanism is not functioning properly merely because a decision of
the community harms some individuals while benefitting others on the basis
of different preferences.213  To so conclude would essentially cast aspersion on
any policy implemented in a democratic state.  Also, it is important to keep in
mind that the playing field at this point is only that which is between the
boundaries already established.214  Thus, at this stage one need not be
concerned with policies that, regardless of their popularity, violate
fundamental principles, such as the denial of access to a mass private space on
the basis of race.  Rather, the problem must be within the mechanism itself, not
in the ultimate outcome.215  One may look at the outcome as evidence of
mechanistic dysfunction.216  But the outcome itself cannot be the sole reason
for taking steps to override community preference.
The concept of illegitimate community decision making is thus a somewhat
elusive concept, although Ely’s seminal work on policing the political process
provides a point of reference.217  The key is that however desirable community
decision making is with regard to SCP in mass private property, it is only
desirable to the extent that the community acts in a fair manner.  The
determination of this issue cannot be based simply on undesirable results but
rather must be rooted in a process that does not allow full and fair participation
of interested parties.218
If the community decision-making process is not properly functioning, then
it is necessary to have recourse to remedial measures.  Once again, there is not
a single correct solution to this problem that will work in all cases; there are
several possibilities.  One approach is for courts to impose their own
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219. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769, 797 (1971) (“The ultimate test of [a court’s work], I suggest, must be
goodness. . . .”).
220. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  This particular
example, racial discrimination, would almost certainly fall outside the boundaries of the range
for community regulation.  However, the important point here, whether it is boundary setting
or incursion into the community decision-making process under certain circumstances, is that
this is an extracommunity mechanism of effecting each of these aspects of the model.
221. ELY, supra note 94, at 73.
222. Id. at 100.
223. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 58 (1990) (discussing situations in which citizens might choose in advance
to have politically insulated administrative actors make certain decisions, where personal
preferences might result in worse substantive outcomes).
224. Cf. id. at 34 (discussing the issue of individual preferences and the challenges that
regulation poses in fulfilling such).
substantive standards.219  A second possibility is to bring the decision-making
process to a broader and higher democratically accountable body.  This might
mean formulating legislation at the county, state, or national level (as opposed
to at the village, town, or city level).  An example of this is American federal
civil rights legislation, in which the federal government imposed limits on
racial discrimination by privately owned places of accommodation (such as
hotels) due to the failure of many states to do so.220
A third possibility, most associated with Ely, is for courts to intervene —
not to impose their own substantive standards, but to “[p]olic[e] the [p]rocess
of [r]epresentation.”221  Under this approach, which Ely asserts is the basis
behind much important United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, courts
impose “procedural protections . . . [that] ensure that in the making of
substantive choices the decision process will be open to all on something
approaching an equal basis, with the decision-makers held to a duty to take
into account the interests of all those who their decisions affect.”222  Ideally,
this is the best approach if it can be implemented successfully because,
although it involves court intervention, ultimately substantive decisions are
made by democratic actors comprised of members or representatives of the
community.
Regarding the other two approaches, each has advantages and disadvantages
within the context of community regulation of SCP.  The first has the
advantage of being able to seek the best substantive results in that decisions
are made by politically insulated actors.223  But this is also its biggest
disadvantage in terms of the model put forth here because decisions are being
made that affect the community by actors that are neither part of the
community nor representatives of it.224
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225. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 37 (discussing how groups that disagree on
fundamental first-order issues might nonetheless reach consensus on important outcomes).
The second possibility is a compromise.  Although the decision making is
taking place by politically accountable representatives, some, but not all, of
these actors will not be members or representatives of the community in
question.  Nevertheless, this latter disadvantage is the very reason why this
option is a possibility.225  It is only when actors who are directly accountable
to the community act in a manner that is unfair that these three options are
considered.  As such, actors who are politically accountable to a broader base
than the community itself may serve to balance out the partisanship that leads
to unacceptable results in cases in which decisions on the community level
operate unfairly.
Conclusion
The proposed model accomplishes two things.  First, by recognizing that
mass private property is highly location specific, it avoids a one-size-fits-all
solution that is implicit in much scholarship on SCP and mass private space.
Second, by asserting the primacy of the community, it provides a framework
for reinforcing community participation in formulating fundamental policy.
The framework does put some boundaries on community preferences.  Outer
boundaries are rooted in property law and in the public character of the
property.  Also, the model provides for alternative mechanisms for when the
community does not act in a procedurally fair model.
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